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DURABLE POWER OF ATTORNEY
I. INTRODUCTION
The financial durable power of attorney, also known as a durable
power of attorney for property management, is a creature of fairly re-
cent origin.' The estate planning bar created it to provide an effective
alternative to guardianship or conservatorship proceedings when peo-
ple become incompetent or incapacitated. 2 Additionally, there was a
sentiment that the wealthy had an effective way of dealing with poten-
tial disability by creating a funded inter vivos trust, and that such a
device was not available to most individuals because of the prohibitive
cost.3 Since its creation, the financial durable power of attorney has
become an extremely popular planning device.4
Recently, however, concerns have been voiced that perhaps we
have created an instrument of abuse rather than a useful tool.5 Some-
times the problems are as clear as wrongful misappropriation of the
principal's property by the agent. 6 Often, however, problems arise be-
1. For a discussion of the history of the financial durable power, see infra notes 12-
29 and accompanying text.
2. See FRANcis J. CoLLN, JR. Er AL., DURABLE POWERS OF ATromNY AND HEALT
CARE DmEcrnms § 2.02, at 2-2 (3d ed. 1995). Two commentators suggest that
guardianships can be expensive as well as unpleasant. A.L. Moses & Adele J.
Pope, Estate Planning, Disability, and the Durable Power of Attorney, 30 S.C. L.
REv. 511, 516 (1979). They suggest that the durable power of attorney is a less
expensive alternative to guardianship. Id.
3. UNip. DURABLE POWER OF ATroRNY AcT Prefatory Note, 8A U.L.A. 310 (1987).
See also John J. Lombard, Jr., Asset Management Under a Durable Power of At-
torney-The Ideal Solution to Guardianships or Conservatorships, 9 PROB. NOTES
189, 190 (1983)(suggesting revocable trust is only partial answer to issue of po-
tential disability).
4. See John J. Lombard, Jr. et al., Legal Problems of the Aged and Infirm-The Du-
rable Power of Attorney-Planned Protective Services and the Living Will, 13
REAL PROP. PROB. & TI. J. 1, 4 (1978)(panel discussion at the 1977 Annual Meet-
ing of the American Bar Association by the Real Property, Probate, and Trust
Section)(reporting results of survey concerning durable powers of attorney; not-
ing that most attorneys responding to survey recommended durable powers of
attorney to their clients); Moses & Pope, supra note 2, at 525 ("[A durable power
of attorney is] a reasonably simple mechanism by which a person may prepare for
a contingency that could have devastating consequences to himself and to his
family. Thus, the possibility of naming an agent under a durable power should be
discussed with any client for whom the lawyer is preparing a will or providing
estate planning services."). See also sources cited infra note 44.
5. See, e.g., David M. English & Kimberly K. Wolff, Survey Results: Use of Durable
Powers, PROB. & PROP., Jan.-Feb. 1996, at 33 (reviewing results of survey con-
ducted by American Bar Association Section of Real Property, Probate, and
Trust; concluding abuse of durable powers of attorney is "relatively infrequent"
but "can produce unfortunate and harmful consequences.").
6. E.g., People v. Dunn-Gonzalez, 55 Cal. Rptr. 404 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996)(affirming
trial court's sentence for fraudulent appropriation by agent under durable power
of attorney who made gifts to herself on principal's behalf); In re Rick, No. 6920,




cause the standards governing the behavior of agents under durable
powers of attorney have never been clearly defined.7 In many in-
stances, those standards have not even been considered. Legislatures,
courts, and commentators have often simply assumed the application
of various bodies of law without careful reflection. In light of the popu-
larity of the financial durable power of attorney, it is surprising that
there has been no in-depth consideration of the parameters of the
agent's duty. There has been only the occasional sentence written,
often merely noting the application of general fiduciary principles.
This Article examines the history and uses of the financial durable
power of attorney and compares it to the alternative property manage-
ment approaches of guardianship and trust creation. It then discusses
the general lack of definition of the role of the agent under the finan-
cial durable power of attorney and problems that this lack of definition
has begun to cause. Finally, it proposes a role for agents that com-
ports with the purposes underlying the creation of financial durable
powers of attorney and the public's expectations about how such pow-
ers will operate.
II. THE DURABLE POWER OF ATTORNEY
A. Definition and History
A power of attorney is an instrument by which a principal empow-
ers an agent to act on the principal's behalf.8 At common law, a power
of attorney was revoked by the incompetency or incapacity of the prin-
cipal.9 Thus, having a power of attorney provided no protection from
the difficulties of becoming incompetent or incapacitated because the
7. E.g., Eby Estate, 6 D.&C.3d 371 (Pa. Ct. Com. Pls. 1977)(considering allegation
that agent under durable power of attorney delayed sale of principal's assets for
unreasonable time).
8. E.g., In re Estate of Lienemann, 222 Neb. 169, 178, 382 N.W.2d 595, 602 (1986).
The agent can also be called an "attorney in fact." Id.
9. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 122 (1957). See Unif. Probate Code [herein-
after U.P.C.] Part 5, prefatory note, 8 U.L.A. 511 (1987). See also Golleher v.
Horton, 715 P.2d 1225, 1229 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1985).
A narrow exception to revocation by incompetence existed if the power of the
agent was coupled with an interest. See, e.g., Johnson v. Natl Bank of Mattoon,
151 N.E. 231, 232 (Ill. 1926); Witherington v. Nickerson, 152 N.E. 707, 709
(Mass. 1926). Thus, if the agent had a present interest in the property over
which the power was to operate, the power would not end at the incompetence of
the principal. See, e.g., Hunt v. Rousmanier's Administrators, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.)
174, 203-04 (1823). See also Alexander M. Meildejohn, Incompetent Principals,
Competent Third Parties, and the Law of Agency, 61 IND. L.J. 115, 118-45(1986)(discussing cases in which courts have upheld the acts of agents represent-
ing principals under traditional powers of attorney).
[Vol. 75:574
DURABLE POWER OF ATTORNEY
power of attorney would cease to be effective at the exact moment that
the principal needed it most.' 0
The notion of durability had its genesis in this deficiency of a com-
mon-law power of attorney. Two approaches to durability are possi-
ble: 1) a power of attorney can be immediately effective and survive
the incapacity of the principal (the "immediately effective" power) or 2)
the power of attorney can become effective only when the principal
becomes incapacitated (the "springing" power).1 1
In 1954, Virginia enacted the first statute that allowed an agent to
continue to act as empowered by a power of attorney even after the
principal became disabled, incompetent, or incapacitated. 12 Ten years
later, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws promulgated the Model Special Power of Attorney for Small
Property Interests Act ("the 1964 Act").13 The 1964 Act was designed
to be a less expensive alternative to guardianship or conservatorship
proceedings.14 Designed to be used only in situations involving lim-
10. See COLLIN Er AL., supra note 2 § 1.01, at 1-1. One commentator has noted that
the non-durable power may have less than full efficacy even before the principal
becomes incompetent because third parties might be unwilling to deal with the
agent of a principal who might be incompetent. Lombard, supra note 3, at 189.
11. See generally COLLIN ETr AL., supra note 2, § 2.02, at 2-2. The U.P.C. offers two
suggested clauses to express durability. U.P.C. § 5-501, 8 U.L.A. 513 (1987).
Language similar to the first clause--"This power of attorney shall not be af-
fected by subsequent disability or incapacity of the principal, or lapse of time--
authorizes immediately effective powers. See CoLuN Er AL., supra note 2, § 2.02,
at 2-6. If the statute allows language like the second clause-"This power of at-
torney shall become effective upon the disability or incapacity of the principal,"
the statute authorizes a springing power. See COLLIN ET AL., supra note 2, § 2.02,
at 2-6. See also CAL. PROB. CODE § 4030 (West Supp. 1996)(defining springing
power).
12. VA CODE ANN. § 11-9.1 (Michie 1950).
13. HANDBOOK OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COAMflSSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE
LAws AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE ANNUAL CONFERENCE MEETING IN ITS SEvENTY-
THIRD YEAR 275-81 (1964).
14. The prefatory note to the 1964 Act states in pertinent part:
The purpose of this model Special Power of Attorney Act is primarily to
provide a simple and inexpensive legal procedure for the assistance of
persons with relatively small property interests, whose incomes are
small, such as pensions or social security payments, and who, in antici-
pation or because of physical handicap or infirmity resulting from injury,
old age, senility, blindness, disease or other related or similar cause,
wish to make provision for the care of their personal or property rights or
interests, or both when unable adequately to take care of their own af-
fairs. It is not contemplated that a power of attorney executed under
this Act will be used for the general handling of sizeable commercial
property interests. Neither is it intended wholly to replace conservator-
ship or guardianship, but rather it is designed as a less expensive
alternative.
HANDBOOK OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMIISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE
LAws AND PROCEEDINGS OF TnE ANNUAL CONFERENCE MEETING IN ITS SEVENTY-
THIRD YEAR 274 (1964). See CoLIN ET AL., supra note 2, § 2.02, at 2-4. In its
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ited assets, the act was fairly comprehensive, and included a number
of safeguards. For example, the Act required that powers executed
under it had to be approved by a judge of a court of record to be
valid.15 Interestingly, the 1964 Act offered three standards relating to
the liability of the agent.16 Alternative one made the agent liable only
in the case of "intentional wrongdoing, [gross negligence], or fraud."17
The second alternative held the uncompensated agent liable only for
"intentional wrongdoing, gross negligence, or fraud" but held the com-
pensated agent to the standard applied to other fiduciaries.8 Alter-
native three held all agents to the standard applied to other
fiduciaries.19 The three alternatives were the result of a divergence of
opinion among the Commissioners on Uniform State Laws.20 Origi-
nally, the drafting committee suggested the lowest standard, alterna-
tive one, because they thought that small amounts of assets would be
involved and relatives or close friends would be serving as agents
"without compensation and as a labor of love."21 The 1964 Act re-
ceived limited acceptance, 22 although a number of states may have
enactment of a version of the 1964 Act, the Arkansas General Assembly noted
that it was attempting to provide a workable alternative to guardianships, which
it viewed as expensive. Acts 1965, No. 61, § 14, Feb. 12, 1965 (Emergency
Clause).
15. Section 1 of the 1964 Act provided in part:
(a) If a [resident of][person within] this state desires to execute a power
of attorney in anticipation or because of infirmity resulting from injury,
old age, senility, blindness, disease, or other related or similar cause as a
means of providing for the care of his person or property, or both, he
shall sign the instrument in the presence of and with the approval of ajudge of [a court of record] of the [county] in which the power is
executed....
(b) The approval of the judge may be given only if:
(1) the principal requests approval;
(2) the attorney in fact consents to serve;
(3) the judge is satisfied, after any examination and investigation he
deems appropriate, that the principal is a person covered by this Act and
reasonably understands the nature and purpose of the power, and that
the attorney in fact is a suitable person to carry out the obligations im-
posed upon him; and
(4) the provisions of this Act have been observed. Approval may be
given.., without the necessity of service of summons or other notice and
shall be endorsed upon the face of the original of the instrument. The
power remains valid until terminated as provided in this Act.
MODEL SPECIAL POWER OF ATTORNEY FOR SMALL PROPERTY INTEREsTs AcT § 1
(1964).
16. Id. § 7 (1964).





22. The 1964 Act was enacted by Arkansas in 1965, and remains in effect in that
state. Apax CODE. ANN. §§ 28-68-301 to 28-68-313 (Michie 1987). In Arkansas,
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borrowed provisions from it to use in enactments of the later Uniform
Probate Code or Uniform Durable Power of Attorney Act.23
When the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws approved and promulgated the Uniform Probate Code ("U.P.C.")
in 1969, it included sections 5-501 and 5-502. These sections provided
that the authority of an agent to act under a power of attorney could
continue beyond the incompetence of the principal.24 In addition to
the idea of durability, the U.P.C. altered the common-law rule that the
death of the principal ended the authority of an agent under a durable
power of attorney and voided any acts performed by the agent after
the death.25 After the promulgation of the U.P.C., the durable power
of attorney gained rapid acceptance. 26
In 1979, the National Conference amended and expanded the sec-
tions of the U.P.C. dealing with durable powers of attorney and ap-
proved the Uniform Durable Power of Attorney Act ("U.D.P.A.A."), a
free-standing act paralleling the language of and designed to act as an
alternative to sections 5-501 to 5-505 of the U.P.C.27 All fifty states
powers under the act could control only property worth under $20,000 or an an-
nual income interest of less than $6,000. Arkansas also enacted statutes similar
to section 5-501 to 5-503 of the Uniform Probate Code, 8 U.L.A. 513-514 (1987).
Ajma CODE ANN. §§ 28-68-201 to 28-68-203 (Michie 1987).
23. For example, the 1964 Act included a provision requiring the agent to account.
MODEL SPECIAL POWER OF ATTORNEY FOR SmALL PROPERTY INTERESTS ACT § 9
(1964). A number of states have a similar requirement. See also infra notes 24
and 27.
24. See U.P.C. §§ 5-501, 5-502, 8 U.L.A. 513-14 (1987).
25. See U.P.C. part 5 prefatory note, 8 U.L.A. 511 (1987). Sections 5-501 and 5-502 of
the 1969 and 1975 versions of the U.P.C. gave limited protection to an agent who
acted after the principal had died. See U.P.C. § 5-504 cmt., 8 U.L.A. 516 (1987).
The 1979 revisions broadened the agent's protection and moved it to section 5-
504. U.P.C. § 5-504, 8 U.L.A. 516 (1987). Many states have adopted similar
rules. See, e.g., Ai,& CODE § 26-1-2(d) (1992); ALAsKA STAT. § 13-26-356 (Supp.
1995); CAL. PROB. CODE § 4304 (West Supp. 1995); DEL. CODE ANN. tit 12, § 4904
(1987). This makes imposing a burden to act on an agent less troublesome be-
cause the agent has increased protection.
26. See COLLIN ET AL., supra note 2, § 2.02, at 2-2.
27. UNsF. DuRABLE POWER OF ATroRNEY Acr, prefatory note, 8A U.L.A. 309 (1987).
See COLLIN Er AL., supra note 2, § 2.03, at 2-7. The 1979 Act was less comprehen-
sive and specific than the 1964 Act. See COLLIN ET AL., supra note 2, § 2.02, at 2-
4.
Section 5-501 authorizes durability and states:
A durable power of attorney is a power of attorney by which a principal
designates another his attorney in fact in writing and the writing con-
tains the words "This power of attorney shall not be affected by subse-
quent disability or incapacity of the principal, or lapse of time," or "This
power of attorney shall become effective upon the disability or incapacity
of the principal," or similar words showing the intent of the principal
that the authority conferred shall be exercisable notwithstanding the
principal's subsequent disability or incapacity, and, unless it states a
time of termination, notwithstanding the lapse of time since the execu-
tion of the instrument.
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and the District of Columbia have enacted statutes authorizing dura-
bility of powers. 28 Thus, the financial durable power of attorney is an
available planning tool throughout the United States.29
B. Attributes and Uses
Initially, it should be noted that durable powers of attorney can
typically be placed in one of two categories: 1) powers aimed at man-
agement of the principal's property and 2) powers designed to em-
power the agent to make health care decisions on behalf of the
principal. The concerns addressed in this Article are unique to finan-
cial durable powers of attorney, although some of the ideas presented,
like a potential duty to act on behalf of the principal, can be carried by
analogy to situations involving health care durable powers of
attorney.
U.P.C. § 5-501, 8 U.L.A. 513 (1987).
28. ALA. CODE § 26-1-2 (1992); ALASKA STAT. § 13.26.350 (Supp. 1995); Amiz. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 14-5501 (1995); ARm CODE ANN. §§ 28-68-201, 28-68-202 (Michie
1987); CAL. PROB. CODE §§ 4123-4125 (West Supp. 1996); CoLO. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 15-14-501 (West Supp. 1995); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45a-562 (West 1993);
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, §§ 4901-4902 (1987); D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 21-2081, 21-2082
(1989); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 709.08 (West Supp. 1995); GA. CODE ANN. § 10-6-36
(Michie 1994); HAw. REV. STAT. §§ 551D-1, 551D-2 (1993); IDAHO CODE §§ 15-5-
501, 15-5-502 (Supp. 1995); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 755, para. 45/2-6 (Smith-Hurd
1992); IND. CODE ANN. § 30-5-4-1 (West 1994); IowA CODE ANN. § 633.705 (West
1992); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 58-610, 58-611 (1994); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 386.093
(Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1984); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 3027 (West 1994); ME. REV.
STAT. ANN. tit. 18-A, §§ 5-501, 5-502 (West Supp. 1995); CODE ANN. EST. &
TRuSTS. § 13-601 (Supp. 1995); MASS. GEN. LAWs ANN. ch. 201B, §§ 1, 2 (West
1990); MICH. Com. LAws ANN. § 700.495 (West 1995); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 523.07
(West Supp. 1995); Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 87-3-105, 87-3-107 (Supp. 1995); Mo.
ANN. STAT. § 404.705 (Vernon 1990); MONT. CODE ANN. § 72-5-501 (1995); NEB.
REV. STAT. §§ 30-2665, 30-2666 (1989); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 11.460 (Michie
1993); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 506:6 (1994); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 46:2B-8 (West
1989); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 45-5-501, 45-5-502 (Michie 1995); N.Y. GEN. OLIG. Lw
§ 5-1505 (McKinney Supp. 1995); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 32A-8, 32A-9 (1995); N.D.
CENT. CODE §§ 30.1-30-01, 30.1-30-02 (Supp. 1995); OHmo REV. CODE ANN.
§ 1337.09 (Anderson 1993); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 58, §§ 1072, 1073 (West 1995);
OR. REV. STAT. § 127.005 (Supp. 1994); 20 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5604 (Supp.
1995); R.I. GEN. LAws § 34-22-6.1 (1995); S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-5-501 (Law. Co-op.
Supp. 1995); S.D. CODIFIED LAws ANN. § 59-7-2.1 (1993); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 34-
6-102, 34-6-103 (1991); TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. §§ 482, 484 (West Supp. 1996);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-5-501 (1993); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 3051 (1989); VA.
CODE ANN. § 11-9.1 (Michie Supp. 1995); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 11.94.010
(West Supp. 1995); W. VA. CODE §§ 39-4-1, 39-4-2 (Supp. 1994); Wis. STAT. ANN.
§ 243.07 (West Supp. 1995); Wyo. STAT. § 3-5-101 (Supp. 1995).
29. See Michael N. Schmitt & Steven A. Hatfield, The Durable Power of Attorney:
Applications and Limitations, 132 Ma. L. REV. 203, 205 (1991)(noting all states
have adopted either the U.D.P.A.A., the U.P.C. provisions governing durable
powers of attorney, or some combination of them).
DURABLE POWER OF ATTORNEY
In most states, the principal must express the intention that the
power be durable.30 It is possible, however, that even an instrument
that does not contain an express durability provision can be inter-
preted to create a durable power of attorney.3 1
Although the durable power of attorney is designed to survive the
incompetency of the principal, the principal must, of course, be compe-
tent when he executes the durable power of attorney for the power to
be valid.32 Further, if a person loses competency, he or she cannot
revoke a durable power of attorney while incompetent.33
With respect to execution formalities, durable powers of attorney
are generally easier to execute than wills. Typically, the only execu-
tion requirements are that the power be in writing and signed by the
30. E.g., In re Kern, 627 N.Y.S.2d 257, 259 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1995)(power of attorney
instrument lacking language providing that authority of agent is to continue even
if principal becomes disabled is not durable). See also U.P.C. Part 5 prefatory
note, 8 U.L.A. 511 (1987)(stating instrument creating durable power of attorney
must include language expressing principal's intent that power be durable).
31. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 10-6-36 (Michie 1994). Under the Georgia statute, all
powers are durable unless the instrument expressly provides otherwise. Louisi-
ana and Pennsylvania have similar rules. LA. Ciw. CODE ANN. ART. 3027(B) (West
Supp. 1994); 20 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5601.1 (Supp. 1996)). See also In re Head,
615 P.2d 271 (N.M. Ct. App. 1980)(holding instrument that granted power to
agent "without limitation" was durable).
32. See U.P.C. § 5-501 comment, 8 U.LA. 513 (1987)(noting provisions governing du-
rable power of attorney assume competence of principal at execution). See also
Lombard, supra note 3, at 190; Paul L. Sturgul, Financial Durable Powers of At-
torney, 41 No. 5 PRAc. LAw. 21, 28 (July 1995)(suggesting wisdom of having prin-
cipal's physician execute affidavit of principal's competency on date of execution
of power).
The requirement of competency at the time of execution will probably not in-
validate many durable powers of attorney because a person is presumed compe-
tent to execute such an instrument. See, e.g., In re Head, 615 P.2d 271, 274-75
(N.M. Ct. App. 1980)(discussing presumption of capacity). Cf. In re Rick, No.
6920, 1994 WL 148268 (Del. Ch. Ct. March 23, 1994)(finding presumption
overcome).
Most jurisdictions that have considered the issue have held that competence
to execute a durable power of attorney is similar to the competence required to
execute a contract. E.g., In re Guardianship of Ray, No. 657, 1991 WL 179418, at
*4 (Ohio Ct. App. Sept. 16, 1991)(defining capacity to execute durable power of
attorney as "the ability of the principal to understand the nature, scope and the
extent of the business she is about to transact"). Cf In re Rick, No. 6920, 1994
WL 148268, *5 (Del. Ch. Ct. March 23, 1994)(applying standard for testamentary
capacity to durable power of attorney).
Additionally, a power of attorney can be challenged on the ground that it was
the product of undue influence. In Risbeck v. Bond, for example, an Alzheimer's
patient sought to void a power of attorney because he signed it under undue influ-
ence. Risbeck v. Bond, 885 S.W.2d 749 (Mo. Ct. App. 1994).
33. E.g., In re Guardianship of Wise, No. 1-94-2, 1994 WL 521134 (Ohio Ct. App. Sept
21, 1994)(noting same standard of competence applies to execution and revoca-
tion of durable power of attorney). See Moses & Pope, supra note 2, at 523;
Schmitt & Hatfield, supra note 29, at 207.
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principal.34 A few states impose additional execution requirements,
none of which are particularly oppressive.3 5
Once a financial durable power of attorney is validly executed, it
can be an extremely powerful document, authorizing an agent to per-
form virtually any act with respect to the principal's property that the
principal could perform.3 6 This breadth of power coupled with few re-
quired execution formalities creates a fear of overreaching by unscru-
pulous agents.3 7
With respect to breadth of powers, there are a few restrictions on
the acts that can be delegated to agents under durable powers of attor-
ney.3 8 The restrictions may come from statutes,3 9 common law, public
34. See, e.g., Bank IV, Olathe v. Capitol Fed. Sav. & Loan Assoc., 828 P.2d 355 (Kan.
1992)(noting form used for durable power of attorney was "cut from a magazine,"
validity of power not at issue).
35. See, e.g., ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 14-5503 (West Supp. 1995)(requiring notariza-
tion and attestation); CAL. PROB. CODE § 4121 (West Supp. 1996)(providing dura-
ble power of attorney must be either notarized or attested by two witnesses);
Conn. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45a-562 (West 1993)(requiring durable power of attor-
ney be executed and witnessed in same manner as deed, i.e., the power must be:
1) in writing; 2) subscribed; 3) acknowledged to be the voluntary act of the princi-
pal, and 4) attested by two witnesses); S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-5-501 (Law. Co-op.
Supp. 1995)(requiring durable powers of attorney to be signed by the principal,
attested by two witnesses, and recorded like a deed); TF&X. POB. CODE ANN.
§ 36A(c)(4) (West Supp. 1996)(requiring durable power of attorney be notarized).
See also Moses & Pope, supra note 2 at 518-20 (discussing South Carolina execu-
tion, attestation, and probate requirements). A court may be willing to give some
effect to the principal's wishes, even if a power of attorney is not validly executed.
Byrne v. Schneider, 808 S.W.2d 936, 940-41 (Mo. Ct. App. 1991)(honoring nomi-
nation of guardian in unacknowledged power of attorney even though statute
governing power required acknowledgement).
36. Because the agent under a durable power of attorney can act with respect to any
of the principal's property, his power is broader than that of a trustee. See Lom-
bard, supra note 3, at 9. For a comparison of the roles of agent and trustee, see
infra notes 151-53 and accompanying text.
37. See Sandra G. Krawitz, The Florida Durable Power of Attorney Becomes a Docu-
ment to Respect-1995 Changes, FLa BAR J., Dec. 1995, at 14 (noting ease of pro-
curing and executing durable power of attorney under pre-1995 Florida law;
suggesting combination of factors invited fraud).
38. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF AGENCY § 17 (1957); Moses & Pope, supra note 2, at
526 (discussing nondelegable acts); Sturgul, supra note 32, at 29-30 (noting the
following powers are frequently non-delegable: making or revoking a will, fund-
ing a trust, changing beneficiaries on an insurance policy, taking a marriage vow
or an oath, voting, performing under a personal service contract, and performing
fiduciary responsibilities).
Special concerns may arise when the disabled principal was a professional.
For example, the existence of a privilege like the attorney-client privilege may
have implications on the delegation of powers to an agent. See Kent H. McMahan
et al., Disability Planning for Executives and Professionals, 23 REAL PROP. PRoB.
& Ti. J. 73, 105-07 (1988)(Report of Probate and Trust Division Committee E-4
on Special Problems of Executives and Professionals). Further, if the principal is
a sole incorporated professional, it is unclear whether an agent can act on behalf
of the principal with respect to the business of the corporation. See id. at 104.
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policy limitations, or contract provisions that curtail the delegation of
duties or assignment of rights.40 Although few courts have considered
the limits of delegability, the existing decisions suggest that the range
of non-delegable acts is fairly narrow. 41 Even if a restriction exists, its
validity might be subject to challenge. Thus, the breadth of a durable
power is virtually limitless.
Additionally, a court has fairly limited supervisory power over an
agent under a durable power of attorney.42 Court approval for the
agent's acts is generally not required.43
Additionally, the right to appear in court pro se cannot be delegated to an
agent under a power of attorney. See, e.g., Christiansen v. Melinda, 857 P.2d 345,
348 (Alaska 1993)(holding agent could not file small claims action pro se on prin-
cipal's behalf); Long v. Delarosa, No. SPM-9412-4880, 1995 WL 50275 (Conn.
Super. Ct. Jan. 30, 1995)(holding agent could not prosecute case pro se on princi-
pal's behalf). To allow such conduct would circumvent the statutes proscribing
the unauthorized practice of law. See, e.g., Christiansen v. Melinda, 857 P.2d
345, 358 (Alaska 1993); Risbeck v. Bond, 885 S.W.2d 749 (Mo. Ct. App. 1994); In
re Estate of Friedman, 482 N.Y.S.2d 686, 687 (Sur. Ct. Bronx City 1984).
39. E.g., CAL. PROB. CODE § 4265(a) (West Supp. 1995)(providing power of attorney
may not authorize agent to make, amend, or revoke principal's will); FLA STAT.
ANN. § 709.08(7)(b) (West Supp. 1995)(listing non-delegable powers). See also
CAL. CrV. CODE § 2356(d) (West Supp. 1996)(providing agent under durable
power of attorney cannot vote stock of California corporation after principal is
adjudged incompetent); CAL. CORP. CODE § 2219 (West Supp. 1996)(providing
only guardian can vote stock of person adjudged incompetent); D.C. CODE ANN.
§ 45-601 (1981)(prohibiting execution of deeds by agent unless certain require-
ments are met); Harley J. Spitler, Using the New Durable Power of Attorney as a
Planning Tool, CAL. LAw., May 1982, at 38 (noting anomalous situation that
agent can sell, buy, and make gifts of stock while principal is incompetent, but
cannot vote stock during that period).
40. E.g., In re Marital Trust Under John W. Murphey and Helen G. Murphey Trust v.
John and Helen Murphey Foundation, 819 P.2d 1029 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1991)(hold-
ing settlor could not delegate power to amend trust to agent under durable power
of attorney when trust indenture provided that power to amend was personal to
settlor). See McMahan et al., supra note 38, at 99; COLLIN r AL., supra note 2,
§ 2.01, at 2-1. One cannot marry by proxy in most states. See COLLm ET AL.,
supra, § 2.01, at 2-1. Likewise, one cannot generally delegate one's duties under
a personal services contract. RESTATEMrENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 17 cmt. a, il-
lus. 1 (1957); CoLLn L-r AL., supra, § 2.01, at 2-1.
41. In re Estate of Schriver, 441 So. 2d 1105 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983)(holding surviv-
ing spouse's right to claim statutory share of deceased spouse's estate could be
delegated to agent under durable power of attorney); Brewington v. Brewington,
313 S.E.2d 53 (S.C. Ct. App. 1984)(holding power to seek separation, mainte-
nance, support, and equitable distribution could be delegated; appearing to recog-
nize power to divorce could not be delegated). See COLLnm ET AL., supra note 2,
§ 2.01 at 2-2.
42. See U.P.C. Part 5, prefatory note, 8 U.L.A. 511 (1987)(noting original durable
power of attorney provisions were designed "to assist persons interested in estab-
lishing non-court regimes for the management of their affairs in the event of later
incompetency or disability")(emphasis added).
43. See, e.g., In re Estate of Hegel, 668 N.E.2d 474, 478 (Ohio 1996)(noting transac-
tions by agent do not require court approval).
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Estate planners view the durable power of attorney as an impor-
tant planning tool, and its use is widely recommended. 44 It can be
broad, and it is easy to execute. The cost of executing a durable power
of attorney will probably be less than the cost of creating an inter
vivos trust or instituting a guardianship.45 A person may not even
need to consult an attorney to obtain a durable power of attorney be-
cause a state statute may provide a form durable power of attorney.46
Additionally, powers of attorney in printed form are widely available
in stationery and office supply stores.47 In sum, a durable power of
attorney is an inexpensive, popular tool that creates a much more flex-
ible arrangement than either a guardianship or a trust. With flexibil-
ity, however, comes the possibility for abuse.48
III. THE PROBLEM
The most serious problem with the financial durable power of at-
torney is that neither courts nor legislatures appear to have given
much thought to the appropriate role of an agent empowered by such
a document. Thus, when questions arise about the propriety of agents'
actions or inactions, courts, agents, and other interested persons have
little guidance available. Some have assumed that the agent under a
durable power of attorney should be governed by traditional agency
44. See COLLiN ET AL., supra note 2, § 1.02, at 1-4 ("[Tihe Durable Power of Attorney
is an essential component of every estate plan."); English & Wolff, supra note 5,
at 33 (noting 49% of lawyers who responded to survey about durable powers of
attorney prepared durable powers of attorney for over 90% of their personal cli-
ents); Lombard et al., supra note 4, at 4 (reporting results of survey concerning
durable powers of attorney; noting that most attorneys responding to survey rec-
ommended durable powers of attorney to their clients); Lombard, supra note 3, at
191 ("[N]o estate planning job in the future should be regarded as complete with-
out a suggestion that a Durable Power of Attorney be signed in addition to the
Will."); Sturgul, supra note 32, at 21-22 (suggesting that durable power of attor-
ney is "the right advice" for clients who seek to aid elderly relatives in handling
financial matters).
45. Sturgul, supra note 32, at 22 (suggesting durable powers of attorney developed
for people with limited means); EDWARD H. BORDIN ET AL., CALIFORNIA DURABLE
POWER OF ATTORNEY HANDBOOK § 1.13, at 17 (1995).
46. E.g., ALAsKA CODE § 13.26.332 (Supp. 1995); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 1-43 (West
1988); N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 5-1501 to -1503 (McKinney Supp. 1996); TE=
PROB. CODE ANN. § 490 (West Supp. 1996). See also Jeffrey A. Baskies, Florida
Needs Legislative Change Regarding Durable Powers of Attorney, FLA. BAR J. at
59 (April 1995)(suggesting Florida law be changed to include standard form dura-
ble power of attorney).
47. See English & Wolff, supra note 5, at 33. See also CAL. PRon. CODE § 4102 (West
Supp. 1996)(regulating sale of form durable powers of attorney).
48. Sturgul, supra note 32, at 23 ("[Blecause durable financial powers are designed to
avoid the problems inherent in judicial supervision, problems can arise from that
very lack of oversight."). See also English & Wolff, supra note 5, at 33 (noting
that 40% of attorneys responding to survey about durable powers of attorney re-
ported knowing of at least one misuse of a durable power of attorney).
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rules49 or by rules analogous to those governing guardians5O or trust-
ees,51 while others have simply assumed the application of general
fiduciary principles. The danger of abuse may be heightened in a ju-
risdiction that has a statute setting forth a form power of attorney or
that allows the sale of form durable powers of attorney because princi-
pals who execute form powers may fail to appreciate the breadth of
the power they are granting.52
The basic problem of lack of a well-defined role for the agent is only
exacerbated by the fact that the statutes authorizing durable powers
of attorney are not uniform.53 Often, powers executed under the laws
of another state are recognized even though they fail to comply with
the interpreting state's execution requirements. 54 Because durable
powers of attorney are governed by state law, conflict of laws issues
often arise. As a general rule,
[tihe rights and duties of a principal and agent toward each other are deter-
mined by the local law of the state which, with respect to the particular issue,
has the most significant relationship to the parties and the transaction.5 5
With respect to validity of the instrument, the governing law is that of
the state where the power was executed.56 On the other hand, the
agent's acts are judged by the law of the state in which the agent
acts.57 The principal may be able to specify that a particular state's
law will govern.58
Against this background, in the context of protective proceedings,
several courts have refused to appoint a guardian for a person when it
appeared that the person's property was being adequately managed
49. E.g., In re Estate of Lienemann, 222 Neb. 169, 178, 382 N.W.2d 595, 602
(1986)(non-durable power of attorney).
50. See, e.g., In re Estate of Schriver, 441 So. 2d 1105, 1107 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1983)(stating "[wihile not a 'guardian' in the legal sense, the attorney in fact has
fiduciary duties similar in nature").
51. E.g., CoLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 15-14-606 (West Supp. 1995); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 709.08 (West Supp. 1995)(providing agent held to same fiduciary standard as
trustee); Kline v. Orebaugh, 519 P.2d 691, 695 (Kan. 1974)(noting remedy for
wrongdoing by agent is same as remedy for wrongdoing by trustee).
52. See COLLIN r AL., supra note 2, § 2.05, at 2-15. See also English & Wolff, supra
note 5, at 34 (noting attorneys responding to survey about durable powers of at-
torney were concerned about inadequate warnings about granting broad powers
in stationery store forms).
53. See COLLIN ET AL., supra note 2 § 2.04, at 2-11.
54. See, e.g., Alm. REv. STAT. ANN. § 14-5503(C) (West Supp. 1995) (recognizing pow-
ers executed in other jurisdictions if validly executed in other jurisdiction); CAL.
PRO. CODE § 4053 (West Supp. 1996)(recognizing powers of attorney executed in
other jurisdictions); S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-5-501(E) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1995)(rec-
ognizing foreign powers even though they don't comply with South Carolina at-
testation requirement).
55. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICTS § 291 (1971).
56. See COLLIN ET AL., supra note 2, § 2.06, at 2-16.
57. See id. at 2-17; RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF CONFLICTS § 292 (1971).
58. See COLLN Er AL., supra note 2, § 2.06, at 2-17.
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under a durable power of attorney.59 The courts' position makes the
necessity of a better defined role for agents obvious. A court should
have some assurance that the agent will continue to manage the prin-
cipal's affairs in an adequate manner. Today, in most jurisdictions,
the agent could merely cease acting, leaving the incompetent principal
unprotected. If the agent terminates the agency, his duty to the prin-
cipal would end.6o In such a case, the only way to protect the incom-
petent would be to commence a second protective proceeding, thus
doubling the expense that the durable power of attorney was designed
to avoid entirely.
Furthermore, some have suggested form durable powers of attor-
ney. These forms make little effort to ensure that the agent will act
responsibly.6 1 Often, forms suggest the use of broad exculpatory
clauses, which further exacerbates the potential problem caused by
the lack of definition of the agent's role. Not only is the law unclear
59. Conover, Incompetent, 2 Fid. Rep. 2d 200 (Pa. Ct. Com. P1. 1984). The court
found Mrs. Conover incompetent, but also found that her agent was efficiently
managing her affairs, making appointment of a guardian unnecessary. Id. at
201-02. In so holding, the court noted that Mrs. Conover appeared to have exe-
cuted the durable power of attorney precisely so that her affairs could be man-
aged if she became incompetent. Id. at 201. The court saw the appointment of a
guardian as a frustration of this intention. Id. at 202. See also In re Guardian-
ship of Pearson, No. CA91-466, 1992 WL 121766 (Ark. App. May 27, 1992)(af-
firming probate judge's refusal to appoint guardian when agent acting under
durable power of attorney was adequately caring for principal's person and es-
tate); In re Estate of Ewing v. Bryan, 883 S.W.2d 545 (Mo. Ct. App. 1994)(termi-
nating guardianship for person who had executed durable power of attorney);
Omo REV. CODE ANN. § 2111.02(C)(5),(6) (Anderson 1994)(providing court can
consider evidence of less restrictive alternative to guardianship in guardianship
proceeding and court can deny guardianship based on finding less restrictive al-
ternative exists). Cf. Rice v. Floyd, 768 S.W.2d 57, 58 (Ky. 1989)(noting purpose
of durable power of attorney statute is to "validate the acts of the attorney-in-fact
during a period of actual disability prior to a finding of legal disability"); In re
Guardianship of Friend, No. 64018, 1993 WL 526643 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec 16,
1993)(affirming lower court's refusal to appoint agent under durable power of at-
torney as guardian of incompetent's estate).
60. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 118 (1958)(suggesting agent can unilat-
erally terminate agency).
61. See Moses & Pope, supra note 2, at 545-46. In their suggested form, they give the
agent the power to resign upon delivering a written resignation to the principal
and recording the resignation. The form does not offer any guidance as to how an
agent is to resign if the principal is incompetent. They do suggest that if resigna-
tion would be detrimental to the principal, the agent may not be permitted to
resign after the principal has become incompetent. Id. at 524. Furthermore, the
suggested form includes an exculpatory clause that absolves the agent from lia-
bility as a result of "any failure to act of [the agent] pursuant to this power of
attorney." The clause releases the agent from liability for claims by the principal
or those taking the principal's property. For a further discussion of exculpatory
clauses, see infra notes 179-80 and accompanying text.
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about what action or inaction will trigger liability, practitioners are
using forms that excuse all but the most egregious misconduct.
As far back as the discussions leading to the promulgation of the
1964 Act, there has been disagreement about the standard by which
an agent's action or inaction should be judged.62 Rather than clarify
this uncertainty, the U.P.C. provisions on durable powers of attorney
simply make no mention of the standard of care.
What, then, is the solution? Legislatures and courts must create a
role for agents under durable powers of attorney that makes clear the
agent's responsibilities. No state has gone far enough to protect the
principal who executes a durable power of attorney to ensure ade-
quate asset management in case of disability.
IV. THE ANALOGY TO TRADITIONAL AGENCY LAW
A durable power of attorney creates an agency relationship be-
tween the principal and the agent. Accordingly, courts have often
looked to agency law when considering issues involving durable pow-
ers of attorney.
A. The Role of the Agent
In most states, the relationship of principal and agent is governed
by common law.63 Some states have codified some or all rules relating
to agencies. 64
The basic duties of an agent are clear and are adopted with little
variation throughout the United States.65 An agent must act solely in
the best interest of the principal when he acts. 66 Thus, he is a fiduci-
ary, owing the principal a fiduciary duty. Further, an agent may not
profit from the agency to the detriment of the principal or have an
interest that conflicts with the principal's interests.6 7
B. Use of Traditional Agency Law with Respect to Acts
Under Durable Powers of Attorney
Under traditional agency law, the power of an agent ended when
the principal became incapacitated. 68 Thus, most agency law is based
62. MODEL SPECIAL POWER OF ATroRNEY FOR SMALL PROPERTY INTERESTS AcT § 7
cmt. (1964). For a discussion of the disagreement, see supra notes ????-21 and
accompanying text.
63. See Lombard, supra note 3, at 196.
64. E.g., CAL. CIv. CODE §§ 2295-2369 (West Supp. 1996)(codifying California agency
law).
65. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §§ 377-86 (1958).
66. E.g., Litvinko v. Downing, 545 S.W.2d 616, 617 (Ark. 1977).
67. E.g., In re Estate of Lienemann, 222 Neb. 169, 178, 382 N.W.2d 595, 602 (1986).
68. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 122 (1958).
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on the presence of a competent principal who can control and monitor
the agent.6 9 Because most agency law was created before acceptance
of the concept of durability of powers of attorney, the law did not con-
template a relationship in which the principal is incompetent.70
A few states have recognized that the standard by which an agent's
actions should be judged should change when the principal becomes
incompetent. 7 1 One state requires that an agent be held to the same
standard of care as a conservator or trustee when the principal is in-
competent.72 Most states, however, continue to apply agency princi-
ples that were fashioned before the durable power of attorney existed.
Beyond this, there has not been much discussion of applying tradi-
tional agency law principles. One commentator has, however, sug-
gested that courts should apply the same transactional analysis when
considering the acts of agents of incompetent principals under durable
powers of attorney that they apply to similar acts under traditional
powers. 7 3 Transactional analysis in the durable power of attorney
69. See, e.g., Warren A. Seavey, The Rationale of Agency, 29 Yale L.J. 859, 863
(1920). Professor Seavey stated:
That the [agency] relationship is consensual there can be no doubt. The
law creates the power upon the voluntary act of the principal and he is
the dominus during its existence. The agent's duty of obedience flows
directly from the control which the cases recognize to be at all times in
the principal.
This control over the existence of the power implies the exercise of the will at the
inception of the relationship, and, as the principal may create the power, so he
may diminish, enlarge, or terminate it at will, subject, of course, to rules for the
protection of third persons. On the other side, the duties of a fiduciary cannot be
thrust upon an unwilling person, so that the relation[ship] cannot be created, nor
can it continue to exist without the consent of both parties. Id. See also
Meiklejohn, supra note 9, at 115-16 (noting agency is consensual relationship);
Valerie Finn-Deluca, Article, The Federal Tax Problems Posed by Durable Powers
of Attorney Which Are Ambiguous as to the Agent's Authority to Make Gifts, 22 N.
Ky. L. REv. 891, 895 (1995)(stating "common law of agency is premised on the
assumption that the principal has sufficient capacity to direct the acts of the
agent")(citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 7 cmt. a).
70. In Georgia, for example, there is no discreet statute dealing with durable powers
of attorney. Rather, the provisions of the Georgia Code dealing with agency ap-
ply to both durable and non-durable powers. GA. CODE ANN. §§ 10-6-1 to -10-6-
142 (Michie 1994 & Supp. 1996). In Georgia, powers of attorney are durable un-
less the principal provides otherwise, and the statute authorizing durability was
simply added into the pre-existing statute governing powers of attorney. Id. § 10-
6-36. See Finn-Deluca, supra note 69, at 895 (noting this problem)(citing RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) of AGENCY § 34.5; Charles M. Hamann, Durable Powers of
Attorney, TR. & EST. 28, 29 (Feb. 1983)). See also Sturgul, supra note 32, at 24
(briefly noting that original "strict fiduciary duty" imposed on agents in many
jurisdictions was later relaxed).
71. E.g., Mo. ANN. STAT. § 404.731.1 (Vernon 1990)(giving probate court jurisdiction
to consider acts of agent after principal becomes incapacitated).
72. CoLo. REv. STAT. ANN. § 15-14-606 (West Supp. 1995).
73. Meiklejohn, supra note 9, at 146.
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context improperly shifts the burden to third parties who enter into
transactions that a court later declares unfair. Rather, a higher level
of responsibility for the agent would appropriately place the burden on
the agent to avoid transactions that are unfair to the principal or risk
liability. Furthermore, the possibility of avoidance would make third
parties even more nervous about transacting business with agents
than they already are. Such a rule would effectively eviscerate the
adequate management of assets that durability was meant to ensure.
V. THE ANALOGY TO GUARDIANSHIP LAW
Most courts and commentators consider guardianship an alterna-
tive to asset management under a durable power of attorney. Courts
often note that durable powers of attorney are an inexpensive alterna-
tive to guardianships. 74 Commentators prefer assets management
under durable powers of attorney because they view guardianships as
expensive, time-consuming, and humiliating to the ward.75 Because
both a guardianship and a durable power of attorney are designed to
ensure appropriate management of a disabled person's assets, it is
useful to consider the workings of guardianship law when attempting
to fashion an appropriate role for the agent under a durable power of
attorney.
A. The Role of the Guardian
In each state, there is a procedure for a court to appoint a fiduciary
for a person who becomes incompetent.76 The mental level of the
ward that will trigger appointment of a fiduciary for the ward's estate
varies from state to state, but it is always grounded on the idea that a
fiduciary should be appointed when the ward can no longer adequately
manage his own affairs.77 The fiduciary may be called a guardian,
74. See, e.g., In re Estate of Schriver, 441 So. 2d 1105, 1106 (Dist. Ct. App. Fl.
1983)(stating durable powers of attorney have 'the beneficial effect of avoiding
the time, expense and embarrassment involved in having to establish guardian-
ships for incompetent persons"); Bank IV, Olathe v. Capitol Fed. Sav. & Loan
Assoc., 828 P.2d 355, 358 (Kan. 1992)(quoting lower court's statement that dura-
ble power of attorney is an inexpensive way to allow management of an impaired
person's property and avoid a conservatorship, which costs approximately
$10,000 plus annual accounting fees).
75. See CoLLiN ET AL., supra note 2, § 1.01, at 1-4. See also Lombard, supra note 3, at
190-91 (describing incompetency proceeding); Moses & Pope supra note 2, at 515
(describing South Carolina procedure for appointment of a committee and noting
procedure is potentially "expensive, time-consuming, and unpleasant").
76. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 3B:12-25 (West 1983).
77. See, e.g., Mo. ANN. STAT. § 475.010(4)(a) (Vernon Supp. 1996)(defining "disabled"
as "[ulnable by reason of any physical or mental condition to receive and evaluate
information or to communicate decisions to such an extent that the person lacks
ability to manage his financial resources;" providing conservator can be ap-
pointed for disabled individual); 20 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5501 (Supp. 1996)(de-
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conservator, committee, or curator.78 In some states a "guardian" pro-
tects personal interests and a "conservator" protects financial inter-
ests.79 Regardless of what the fiduciary is called, when a court
appoints a fiduciary charged with handling a ward's property, the fi-
duciary's duty is to ensure that the ward's needs are met and that the
ward is not subjected to the overreaching of unscrupulous individuals.
Often, the statute governing guardianships sets forth a hierarchy
describing who should be appointed.80 Frequently, a nominee under a
durable power of attorney is mentioned in the hierarchy.1 A guardi-
anship creates a fiduciary relationship between guardian and ward,
with the guardian owing a fiduciary duty to the ward.82 A guardian
has powers and duties to deal with the ward's property, but does not
hold title to the property as a trustee would.83 The guardian's powers
and duties are governed by statute.8 4
With respect to investments by guardians, many jurisdictions im-
pose more stringent rules on guardians than on trustees. For exam-
ple, some states provide that a guardian may not make an investment
without court approval.8 5 Similarly, a state may impose restrictions
on a guardian's ability to perform certain acts.8 6
fining "incapacitated person" as one "whose ability to receive and evaluate
information effectively and communicate decisions in any way is impaired to such
a significant extent that he is partially or totally unable to manage his financial
resources or to meet essential requirements for his physical health and safety").
78. See RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TRUSTS § 7 cmt. c (1959).
79. See, e.g., Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 475.030.1, 475.010(4)(a), 475.010(9) (Vernon 1992 &
Supp. 1996)(providing for appointment of guardian for person and conservator for
estate of incapacitated person; defining "disabled;" defining "incapacity,"
respectively).
80. See, e.g., Mo. ANN. STAT. § 475.050.1 (Vernon Supp. 1996); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 3B:12-25 (West 1983).
81. See, e.g., Mo. ANN. STAT. § 475.050.1(2) (Vernon Supp. 1996); S.D. CODIFIED
LAwS ANN. § 59-7-2.4 (1993)(providing principal can nominate guardian or con-
servator in power of attorney).
82. See RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF TRUSTS § 7 cmt. a (1959).
83. Id. But see N.J. STAT. ANN. § 3B-12-38 (West 1983)(providing that title to ward's
property vests in guardian upon guardian's appointment).
84. See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2111.14 (Anderson 1994); 20 PA. CONS. STAT.
ANN. § 5521 (Supp. 1996). See also RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TRUSTS § 7 cmt. b
(1957).
85. See RESTATEmENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 7 cmt. b (1959); S.D. CODIFIED LAwS
ANN. § 30-29-40 (1984)(providing court can direct investments).
86. See COLLIN ET AL., supra note 2, § 2.03, at 2-9. In Pennsylvania, for example, a
guardian may not lease property for a term longer than five years. 20 PA. CONS.
STAT. ANN. § 5522 (Supp. 1996). See also Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 2111.25 (Ander-
son 1994)(providing guardian may not lease ward's property for a period longer
than three years without court approval).
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Guardians are supervised by the appropriate court, and may need
court approval to act.8 7 Each time a guardian must go to court to seek
approval for an act, he must provide appropriate evidence in support
of his request. Thus, court supervision can be both time-consuming
and expensive.8
Some states have enacted provisions that allow a court to appoint a
fiduciary for a person's estate with limited powers over the estate.8 9
In California, for example, a conservatorship of the estate can be full
or limited.9 0 Conservatorship can be ordered to empower the fiduci-
ary to manage both personal and financial affairs.9' Unlike full con-
servatorship, limited conservatorship can be ordered for a person who
is not totally incompetent. The standard for imposing conservatorship
in California is less strict than in many states. The conservatee need
only be "substantially unable to manage his own financial resources,
or resist fraud or undue influence."92 Thus, California has attempted
to enact a comprehensive statute designed to protect a person needing
protection in the least intrusive manner possible. To help effect this
objective, California law provides for a "Court Investigator," who as-
87. E.g., CAL. PROB. CODE § 2102 (West 1991)(conservator subject to control of court
while performing duties); OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2111.50 (Anderson 1994)(pro-
viding probate court is "superior guardian" of wards subject to its jurisdiction); In
re Joyce, 32 Ohio Law Abs. 553, 557 (Ohio 1940). The Joyce court described the
majority view of the supervision of guardians:
When a guardian of the person has been appointed, the Probate Court is
the agent of the State in protecting the person of that individual. It
takes the place of the individual. The Probate Court, of course, cannot
personally and individually look after all the affairs both of the person
and of the estate of a person who may be incompetent, but its authority
is exercised through an individual known as a guardian, and who is
under the control of the court; and the court is under the directions and
inhibitions of the statute, all made for the protection of the person and
the estate of the person for whom a guardian has been appointed.
Id. See Omo REV. CODE ANN. § 2111.21 (Anderson 1994)(providing guardian may
sell, compromise, or adjust dower rights only with court approval). See also Lom-
bard, supra note 3, at 192.
88. Moses & Pope, supra note 2, at 515 (discussing various difficulties of
guardianships).
89. See, e.g., Mo. ANN. STAT. § 475.010(3)(Vernon 1992)(providing conservator of es-
tate can have full or limited powers).
90. CAL. PROB. CODE §§ 1400-1491, 1800-1910, 2100-2808 (West 1991). See generally
Lawrence Friedman & Mark Savage, Taking Care: The Law of Conservatorship
in California, 61 S. CAL. L. REv. 273 (1988)(describing California law and study-
ing guardianships in San Mateo County, California).
91. Friedman & Savage, supra note 90, at 273.
92. CAL. PROB. CODE § 1801(b) (West 1991). A similar standard is used to determine
whether a conservator of the person should be appointed. A conservator of the
person can be appointed if the conservatee is "unable properly to provide for his
or her personal needs for physical health, food, clothing or shelter." CAL. PROB.
CODE § 1801(a) (West 1991).
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sists the court in deciding whether to appoint a conservator and who
sometimes protects the potential conservatee. 93
After appointment of a guardian or conservator with full or limited
powers, a person is no longer fully legally competent. 94 He cannot
"enter into or make any transaction that binds or obligates the conser-
vatorship estate."95 He might, however, retain some powers to act
that a person who is fully incompetent would lack.96
In most states, a guardian or conservator has broad powers. 97 In
some states, the law of guardianship or conservatorship is quite flexi-
ble.98 With respect to court supervision, guardianship law provides a
number of safeguards. In California, for example, a conservator must
file an account with the court after the first year of the conservator-
ship and biennially thereafter.9 9 In addition, the Court Investigator
reviews the conservatorship after one year and then every other
year.100
Often, the applicable statute allows a potential conservatee to ap-
point his or her conservator.30 The court will appoint the nominee
unless the appointment does not comport with the "best interests" of
the ward.102 Likewise, the wishes of a nervous third party may trig-
ger a guardianship or conservatorship proceeding.1O3 Thus, a person
93. CAL. PROB. CODE §§ 1419, 1454, 1823(b)(4), 1826 (West 1991)(describing role of
Court Investigator). See also Friedman & Savage, supra note 90, at 276 (describ-
ing role of Court Investigator in general and actions of San Mateo County Court
Investigator in particular).
94. E.g., CAL. PROB. CODE § 1872 (West 1991); CAL. CIV. CODE § 40 (West Supp.
1996)(providing that after determination of incapacity, person cannot make any
contract, delegate any power, or waive any right).
95. CAL. PROB. CODE § 1872 (West 1991); Omo REV. CODE ANN. § 2111.02(B)(1) (An-
derson 1994)(allowing court to appoint full or limited guardian); Wyo. STAT. § 3-
1-202 (Supp. 1996)(limiting power of ward with respect to property).
96. See Friedman & Savage, supra note 90, at 276-77. For example, a conservatee
can execute a will or marry if he has actual capacity to perform these acts. CAL.
PROB. CODE §§ 1871(c), 1900, 1901 (West 1991). See Friedman & Savage, supra
note 90, at 277. The court can supervise the conservatee by determining whether
he has the capacity to perform various acts. Id. See also Wyo. STAT. § 3-1-202
(Supp. 1996)(providing ward can make will if ward has testamentary capacity).
97. CAL. PROB. CODE §§ 2450-2467 (West 1991). See also Friedman & Savage, supra
note 90, at 277. In addition to the powers granted by statute, the court can grant
additional powers if the circumstances warrant. CAL. PROB. CODE §§ 2590-2591
(West 1991) One study suggests that requests for additional powers are usually
granted. Friedman & Savage, supra note 90, at 283.
98. See Friedman & Savage, supra note 90, at 285 (discussing California law; sug-
gesting that although some flexibility exists, it is typically only exercised to ex-
pand conservators' powers).
99. CAL. PROB. CODE § 1850(a) (West 1991).
100. CAL. PROB. CODE § 1850 (West 1991).
101. E.g., CAL. PROB. CODE § 1810 (West 1991).
102. Id.
103. See Friedman & Savage, supra note 90, at 280.
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who has doubts about the capacity of a person with whom he wishes to
transact business may desire a competency proceeding. 104 Moreover,
guardianship or conservatorship is appropriate only when there is
mental impairment.105 The sole purpose of court appointment of a fi-
duciary of the estate is to protect one who cannot protect himself.
Some have argued that a danger of overuse of conservatorship
exists.106
In sum, guardianship and conservatorship are highly intrusive
ways to protect a vulnerable person. Even a guardianship or conser-
vatorship is no guarantee, however, that the conservatee's assets will
be appropriately managed.107
B. A Comparison of the Role of Guardian/Conservator with
the Role of Agent
Some view the durable power of attorney as inferior to guardian-
ship because it lacks attributes that protect the principal. 0 8 For ex-
ample, there is much less court supervision of an agent under a
durable power of attorney than of a guardian.10 9
104. Id. Professor Friedman and Mr. Savage give the example of a person who wanted
to purchase a business interest from a stroke victim. Id. They also suggest that
title companies might find appointment of a conservator comforting if they have
doubts about a seller's capacity. Id. See also id. at 286 (discussing convalescent
hospitals).
105. See Friedman & Savage, supra note 90, at 283.
106. See Friedman & Savage, supra note 90, at 285. These commentators suggest that
conservatorship may be sought to protect an inheritance, rather than to protect
the conservatee. Id. They note that "in this society a person generally has the
right to spend, waste, and neglect; there is a thin line between protecting the
helpless and imposing unfair restrictions." Id.
107. See Friedman & Savage, supra note 90, at 285, 290. Based on a Court Investiga-
tor's observations, Friedman and Savage suggest that abuses of the conservator-
ship occur despite safeguards like required inventories and investigations. Id. at
285. They suggest that the fact that many conservators are not experienced fidu-
ciaries may cause difficulties. Id. Also, they note that potential heirs who act as
conservators may feel that the conservatee's assets are already theirs. Id. See
also English & Wolff, supra note 5, at 34 (noting 39% of respondents to survey
about durable powers of attorney said they knew of at least one instance of abuse
by a guardian or conservator).
108. See, e.g., Rice v. Floyd, 768 S.W.2d 57, 59-60 (Ky. 1989)(comparing roles of guard-
ian and agent under durable power of attorney). See also Friedman & Savage,
supra note 90, at 287. These commentators recount the opinion of the San Mateo
County California Court Investigator that a durable power of attorney "has no
protective measures whatsoever," and that the agent need not keep records or
keep relatives informed. Id.
109. Rice v. Floyd, 768 S.W.2d 57, 59 (Ky. 1989)(opining that guardian is answerable
to court while agent is answerable only to principal). See Mo. ANN. STAT.




However, the durable power of attorney allows the principal to de-
cide who will manage his affairs.11o The principal may or may not be
permitted to make that decision under his state's guardianship
law.111 Some states provide that when a principal nominates a guard-
ian, the court must appoint the nominee guardian unless the nominee
is unfit.112 Even if a statute permits a person to nominate a guardian,
the court need not honor the nomination in an incompetency
proceeding.113
A guardian of the estate's primary task is to "manage and con-
serve" the estate of the incompetent.114 Thus, the guardian of the es-
tate must take control of and appropriately manage the ward's
assets.1 15 An agent under a durable power of attorney can, on the
other hand, perform any act for the principal that the governing in-
strument permits.116 Thus, the scope of permissible acts under a du-
rable power of attorney is arguably broader than that under a
110. See, e.g., Rice v. Floyd, 768 S.W.2d 57, 61-62 (Ky. 1989)(Leibson, J., dissent-
ing)(noting durable power of attorney allows self-determination of who will con-
trol affairs).
111. See U.P.C. § 5-503(b), 8 U.LA. 514-15 (1987). Section 5-503(b) states:
A principal may nominate, by a durable power of attorney, the conserva-
tor, guardian of his estate, or guardian of his person for consideration by
the court if protective proceedings for the principal's person or estate are
thereafter commenced. The court shall make its appointment in accord-
ance with the principal's most recent nomination in a durable power of
attorney except for good cause or disqualification.
Id. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 26-1-2(c)(2) (1992)(enacting provision substantially
similar to U.P.C. § 5-503(b)); Omo REV. CODE ANN. § 1337.09(D) (Anderson
1993)(same). See also Sturgul, supra note 32, at 22.
112. E.g., Amc. CODE ANN. § 28-68-203(b) (Michie 1987); CAL. PROB. CODE § 4126
(West Supp. 1996); 20 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5604(c)(2)(Supp. 1996). See also
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 4903(a) (1987)(providing that agent under durable
power of attorney who requests that he be appointed guardian shall be so ap-
pointed absent cause to the contrary).
113. Mo. ANN. STAT. § 475.050 (Vernon Supp. 1996)(giving preference for appointment
as guardian to person nominated in durable power of attorney or by several other
means); In re Mitchell, 914 S.W.2d 844 (Mo. Ct. App. 1996)(upholding lower
court's decision to appoint public administrator rather than nominee in durable
power of attorney as guardian and conservator of incapacitated person); In re
Guardianship of Wise, No. 1-94-2, 1994 WL 521134 (Ohio Ct. App. Sept. 21,
1994)(upholding probate court's decision not to appoint person nominated in du-
rable power of attorney as guardian of the person because nominee lived in Flor-
ida and incompetent lived in Ohio).
114. See, e.g., In re Estate of Hegel, No. CA94-12-103, 1995 WL 37841, at *5 (Ohio Ct.
App. June 26, 1995)(Walsh, P.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), rev'd,
668 N.E. 2d 474 (Ohio 1996).
115. See, e.g., CAL. PROB. CODE § 2401 (West 1991); CAL. PROB. CODE § 2401 Law Revi-
sion Comm'n Cmt. (West 1991).
116. See, e.g., In re Estate of Hegel, 668 N.E.2d 474,476 (Ohio 1996)(noting agent can
act as "alter ego" of principal).
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guardianship.117 Additionally, an agent can decide whether to act on
a situation-by-situation basis and need not act with respect to a par-
ticular piece of property if he chooses not to act.
C. Interaction of Guardians and Agents
Once a person has executed a durable power of attorney, an inter-
esting issue arises if someone thereafter begins a proceeding for
guardianship of the principal.-18 What effect will the proceeding have
on the power of the agent? There are several possible resolutions to
this issue.
First, the guardianship proceeding could automatically terminate
the power of the agent.119 Such an approach makes little sense if the
agency is functioning well.120 Further, such an approach undercuts a
major motivation for allowing durability: to encourage durable powers
of attorney over guardianships.
Second, if there is both a durable power of attorney and a court-
appointed fiduciary, the agent could continue to act. Most states have
adopted the position that court appointment of a fiduciary like a
guardian does not automatically terminate the authority of an agent
under a durable power of attorney.' 2 ' This is the position taken in
section 5-503 of the U.P.C., which provides:
If, following execution of a durable power of attorney, a court of the principal's
domicile appoints a conservator, guardian of the estate, or other fiduciary
117. But see Rice v. Floyd, 768 S.W.2d 57, 59 (Ky. 1989)(opining that "scope of author-
ity, duties and accountability" of guardian are "much broader" than those of an
agent).
118. CoLuN ET AL., supra note 2, § 2.05, at 2-13 to -14.
119. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45a-562(b) (West 1993)(providing durable power of at-
torney ceases at time conservator is appointed for principal's estate); GA. CODE
ANN. § 10-6-36 (Michie 1994)(providing power to act continues until appointment
of guardian or receiver for principal); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 386.093 (Baldwin
1995)(providing authority of agent terminates at court appointment of fiduciary
for principal); TEx. PROB. CODE ANN. § 485 (West Supp. 1996)(providing appoint-
ment of guardian of the estate terminates powers of agent under durable power of
attorney); Rice v. Floyd, 768 S.W.2d 57, 60 (Ky. 1989)(noting Kentucky does not
follow U.P.C. with respect to dual management of incompetent's estate).
120. For a discussion of cases in which courts have refused to appoint a guardian
when there was a functioning agent under a durable power of attorney, see supra
note 59.
121. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 26-1-2(c)(1) (1992)(providing court-appointed fiduciary may
revoke power of attorney and agent is accountable to both principal and court-
appointed fiduciary); ALASKA STAT. § 13.26.350 (Supp. 1995)(same); ARYu CODE
ANN. § 28-68-203 (Michie 1987)(same); 20 PA. CoNs. STAT. ANN. § 5604(c)(1)
(Supp. 1996); S.D. CODIFIED LAws § 29A-5-118 (Supp. 1996)(providing that
guardian may not revoke or amend power of attorney without court approval).
Cf. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 709.08(3) (West Supp. 1996)(suspending authority of agent
when proceeding to determine capacity of principal is commenced unless court
allows agent to act; terminating power when principal is adjudicated incapaci-
tated unless court directs otherwise).
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charged with the management of all of the principal's property or all of his
property except with specified exclusions, the attorney in fact is accountable to
the fiduciary as well as to the principal. The fiduciary has the same power to
revoke or amend the power of attorney that the principal would have had if he
were not disabled or incapacitated.1 22
The second resolution is desirable to ensure full efficacy of the du-
rable power of attorney. Family members, or others with standing,
may petition for a guardianship for the principal if they are unhappy
with the agent's management of the principal's affairs. 123 If the filing
of a petition automatically terminated the agency, and if a principal
were not able to nominate his or her guardian, the principal's inten-
tion to have a particular person make decisions on the principal's be-
half could easily be frustrated.124 On the other hand, a law that
provides for the principal to nominate a guardian and permits an
agent and guardian to co-exist allows the court to fashion the regime
that best suits the needs of the principal. If the court determines that
the principal is incompetent, it could: 1) allow the agent to continue to
manage the principal's affairs without appointing a guardian;12 5 2)
appoint a guardian with limited powers and allow the agent to con-
tinue exercising other powers; 126 3) appoint a guardian with general
powers and allow the agency to continue, or 4) appoint a guardian
with general powers and terminate the agency.
VI. THE ANALOGY TO TRUST LAW
A trust can be an effective way of dealing with potential disability.
In creating the trust, the settlor has almost unlimited freedom in
122. U.P.C. § 5-503, 8 U.L.A. 514-15 (1987). Section 5-503 was added to the U.P.C. in
1979 to "adjust the durable power concept so that it may be used either as an
alternative to a protective procedure, or as a designed supplement enabling nomi-
nation of the principal's choice for guardian to an appointing court and continu-
ing to authorize efficient estate management under the direction of a court
appointee." U.P.C. Part 5 prefatory note, 8 U.LA. 512 (1987).
123. CAL. PROB. CODE § 4206 (West Supp. 1996). See, e.g., In re Guardianship of Pear-
son, No. CA91-466, 1992 WL 121766 (Ark. App. May 27, 1992)(relatives of de-
ceased husband of principal who were likely to inherit from principal filed
guardianship petition and petition for accounting alleging agent under power of
attorney was appropriating principal's property). See also Sturgul, supra note
32, at 35.
124. See U.P.C. § 5-503 cmt., 8 U.L.A. 515 (1987)(noting best reason to allow person to
nominate guardian in durable power of attorney is to ensure that agent will be
able to carry out principal's wishes).
125. See, e.g., Conover, Incompetent, 2 Fid. Rep. 2d 200 (Pa. Ct. Com. P1. O.C. Div.
1984). For a discussion of Conover and similar cases, see supra note 59.
126. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 4903(a) (1987)(providing powers of agent
under durable power of attorney are terminated to the extent those powers are
granted to a court-appointed fiduciary); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 404.731.3 (Vernon
1990)(providing court can enter order determining "powers, duties and responsi-
bilities" of conservator and agent under durable power of attorney, coordinating
the two roles).
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crafting the trust's dispositive provisions. A settlor could, for exam-
ple, create a trust while competent that would require the trustee to
make periodic distributions to the settlor while competent, and allow
the trustee to make distributions for the benefit of the settlor, as
needed, should the settlor become incompetent.
Although trusts are popular planning tools, they are often criti-
cized as overly expensive.12 7 Because a well-crafted trust instrument
is fairly complex, a settlor would probably have to engage an attorney
to create a trust. Once the trust is in existence, the trustee must file
appropriate tax returns for the trust, perhaps generating additional
expenses. Also, if the trustee is someone other than the settlor, there
may be trustee commissions to pay.
A. The Role of the Trustee
The primary source of the trustee's duties is the trust instrument
itself.128 The settlor can direct the trustee to act in a particular way
with respect to the dispositive and administrative provisions of the
trust.12 9 The settlor could also choose to give the trustee discretion as
to how to distribute or manage the trust assets.'3 O
Not all of the trustee's duties arise from the language of the trust
instrument. Trustee powers may also be implied, rather than ex-
press. 131 When the settlor fails to delineate an aspect of the trustee's
duties, trust law fills the interstices. The jurisprudential basis for
such gap-filling is the premise that some duties flow from the relation-
ship between trustee and beneficiary that the settlor has established.
The trustee's duty of loyalty to the beneficiaries, for example, arises
from the nature of the fiduciary relationship between trustee and ben-
eficiary.132 In virtually every instance, the settlor has the ultimate
say about the extent of the Trustee's duties and powers, and can vary
the "default" rules governing duties and powers.
Although a trustee who is named in a trust instrument cannot be
forced to serve as trustee, once he accepts the trust, he has a fiduciary
127. See UNF. DURABLE POWER OF ATroRNEY ACT Prefatory Note, 8A U.L.A. 310
(1987).
128. See AusTrN W. ScoTr & WLL=A W. FRATCHER, THE LAW OF TRUSTS § 164, at 250
(4th ed. 1987).
129. For example, if the settlor provides in the trust that the trustee must pay all
trust income to the settlor for as long as the settlor is living, the trustee has a
duty to pay the income to the settlor in accordance with the terms of the trust.
Similarly, if the settlor directs in the trust that the trustee must send a yearly
accounting to all living adult beneficiaries, the trustee must so account.
130. For example, it is very common to give the trustee discretion to distribute princi-
pal for the support of a beneficiary. Additionally, most settlors give trustees com-
plete discretion with respect to trust investments.
131. See RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TRUSTS § 164 cmt. h (1959).
132. See id. See also ScoT & FRATCHER, supra note 128, § 164.
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duty to administer the trust in accordance with its terms and the
other principles supplied by trust law.' 33 This broad duty of adminis-
tration includes a number of component duties. These include the
duty of loyalty to the beneficiaries,'34 the duty not to delegate non-
ministerial duties,135 the duty to keep accurate accounts,' 3 6 the duty
to furnish information about the trust to the beneficiaries,'37 the duty
to exercise reasonable care and skill in administering the trust,lSS the
duty to muster the assets of the trust, 39 the duty to preserve the trust
property,140 the duty to enforce and defend claims involving trust
property or potential trust property,14' the duty not to commingle
trust property with other property,' 42 the duty to take care in select-
ing any bank in which the trustee wishes to deposit trust assets and to
properly title the deposit,143 the duty to make the trust assets produc-
tive,144 the duty to pay income in a reasonable manner as directed by
the trust,145 the duty to treat multiple beneficiaries impartially,146
the duty to monitor the activities of co-trustees,' 47 and the duty to act
responsibly with regard to a person empowered to control the trustee's
actions. 148
Thus, in many instances, the duty of the trustee with respect to
dispositions of trust property to the beneficiaries of the trust are
wholly delineated by the trust instrument. In other cases, the trustee
may be given discretion with respect to dispositions from the trust,
but will at least be able to identify the intended beneficiaries based on
the language of the trust.' 49 With respect to administrative duties,
again, the trust instrument will often explicitly direct certain trustee
action. Where the trust instrument is silent with regard to either dis-
positive or administrative provisions, the body of trust law, both stat-
utory law and caselaw, is so well developed that courts are seldom
without guidance in deciding whether a trustee's actions complied
with an appropriate standard of fiduciary care.
133. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 169 (1959).
134. Id. § 170.
135. Id. § 171.
136. Id. § 172.
137. Id. § 173.
138. Id. § 174.
139. Id. § 175.
140. Id. § 176.
141. Id. § 177-78.
142. Id. § 179.
143. Id. § 180.
144. Id. § 181.
145. Id. § 182.
146. Id. § 183.
147. Id. § 184.
148. Id. § 185.
149. Id. § 112.
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The well-defined role of the trustee makes the trust an attractive
tool for disability planning. The settlor can direct many of the
trustee's actions if he chooses to do so. Even discretionary powers are
fairly predictable because the trustee has a duty to exercise discretion-
ary powers fairly. Finally, where the settlor has failed to direct the
trustee in any way on a particular issue, there is often controlling pre-
cedent that would guide the trustee in acting. Thus, the settlor can
feel confident that the trust he creates will continue to operate in a
particular way even if he becomes incompetent and cannot monitor
the actions of the trustee.
One of the difficulties in using a trust for disability planning is that
the terms of the trust will be "frozen" at the creation of the trust, un-
less the settlor reserves the right to amend the trust. In certain lim-
ited circumstances, a trustee may be able to deviate from the express
terms of a trust. Usually, the circumstances must include a signifi-
cant change in circumstances not anticipated by the settlor when the
trust was created. Additionally, the person seeking deviation must
show that compliance with the trust's terms would frustrate the pur-
pose of the trust.' 50 To protect himself, a trustee would probably want
court permission to deviate from the terms of a trust, although the
trustee can deviate without prior court approval without incurring lia-
bility in an emergency situation.' 51
B. A Comparison of the Role of Trustee With
the Role of Agent
There are some significant differences between the role of the
trustee and the role of the agent. One of the primary differences be-
tween a trustee and an agent is that a trustee holds legal title to the
property that forms the corpus of the trust while an agent merely has
150. See id. § 167. Section 167 provides:
(1) The court will direct or permit the trustee to deviate from a term of
the trust if owing to circumstances not known to the settlor and not an-
ticipated by him compliance would defeat or substantially impair the ac-
complishment of the purposes of the trust; and in such case, if necessary
to carry out the purposes of the trust, the court may direct or permit the
trustee to do acts which are not authorized or are forbidden by the terms
of the trust.
(2) Under the circumstances stated in Subsection (1), the trustee can
properly deviate from the terms of the trust without first obtaining the
permission of the court if there is an emergency, or if the trustee reason-
ably believes that there is an emergency, and before deviating he has no
opportunity to apply to the court for permission to deviate.
(3) Under the circumstances stated in Subsection (1), the trustee is sub-ject to liability for failure to apply to the court for permission to deviate
from the terms of the trust, if he knew or should have known of the exist-
ence of those circumstances.
151. See id. § 167(2).
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powers with respect to the principal's property.' 5 2 Thus, while the
principal is competent, both the principal and the agent have the
power to act with respect to the principal's property. On the other
hand, once a settlor has transferred property to a trust, he cannot ex-
ercise any control over the property unless, in creating the trust, he
retained the power to do so.
Another significant difference between an agent under a durable
power of attorney and a trustee is that the agent's duties are often
wholly undefined by the document creating the agency.' 53 In the
trust context, the trustee's duties are usually well-defined.15 4 In this
respect, a trust is a directive instrument: it tells the trustee what to
do. If the trust failed to impose legally enforceable duties on the
trustee, it would not be a trust. On the other hand, a durable power of
attorney under the law as it now exists is merely an empowerment
instrument: it describes what the agent can do. Often, durable powers
of attorney contain no indication of how the principal wishes the agent
to act.
It is ironic that the agent under a durable power of attorney, whose
powers often are significantly broader than those of a trustee, lacks
much of a defined role. A trustee manages only that property which
forms the corpus of the trust. In most cases, this is less than all of the
settlor's property. An agent under a durable power of attorney, on the
other hand, frequently has power over all of the principal's assets.1
5 5
VII. THE APPROPRIATE ROLE OF THE AGENT
Unlike death, disability is not certain to occur. This may help to
explain why death planning is much more developed than disability
planning.156 As medical science extends the average life expectancy,
however, the possibility that one will become disabled increases.
1 5 7
Additionally, the statistical chances of becoming at least temporarily
disabled are sobering.15s
152. See, e.g., Smith v. United States, 113 F. Supp. 702, 707 (D. Haw. 1953)(noting
principal remains legal owner of principal's property after executing power of at-
torney). See also RESTATEMENT (SE cOND) OF TRUSTS § 8 cmt. a (1959); Moses &
Pope, supra note 2, at 514.
153. Moses & Pope, supra note 2, at 514.
154. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 164 (1959). For a discussion of a
trustee's duties, see supra notes 128-49 and accompanying text.
155. See BoRDIN ET AL., supra note 45 § 1.7, at 12.
156. See, e.g., Schmitt & Hatfield, supra note 29, at 213.
157. See, e.g., Rice v. Floyd, 768 S.W.2d 57, 61 (Ky. 1989)(Leibson, J., dissenting). See
COLLiN ET AL., supra note § 1.02, at 1-2; Lombard et al., supra note 4, at 1; Lom-
bard, supra note 3, at 189; Meiklejohn, supra note 9, at 115. See also Schmitt &
Hatfield, supra note 29, at 213 (suggesting longer life expectancy means people
consume more of their assets, making lifetime management more important).
158. An often-quoted commentator noted almost thirty years ago:
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In light of these somber statistics, it is not surprising that people
are seeking an effective, economical device to allow asset management
in the event of disability. The likelihood of disability has recently
caused more attorneys to think and write about planning for disabil-
ity.l59 Most disability planning begins with the premise that guard-
ianships should be avoided.160 Thus, attorneys often recommend
other means for dealing with the property of an incompetent.161
The durable power of attorney has come to be regarded as an ex-
tremely useful tool in planning for possible disability.162 It is particu-
larly well-suited to allow management of a person's property while the
person is disabled either mentally or physically. Mental disability
may impair one's legal power to act. Even if a person has sufficient
mental capacity to act, a serious physical disability may make it diffi-
cult for the person to manage his assets.163 The financial durable
power of attorney can assist the principal in both instances, and attor-
neys are strongly recommending the use of durable powers of attorney
to their clients for precisely that reason.1 64
Much has been written about how to draft durable powers of attor-
ney to clearly express the powers that the principal wishes the agent
to have.165 Additionally, one often sees suggestions about how to se-
If disability of any nature, especially a legally incapacitating disabil-
ity, can create serious asset management problems, how likely is it to
occur? Insurance statistics indicate that a twenty-two year old person is
seven and one-half times more likely to suffer a disability of ninety days
or more than he is to die. Such a disability is four and one-quarter times
more likely to occur than death in a sixty-two year old. At age twenty,
789 persons out of 1000 can expect to suffer a disability of ninety days or
more at some time during their lives. At age forty, 635 persons out of
1000 can expect to suffer such a disability, and at age sixty, 221 persons
out of 1000 can expect to suffer a disability lasting ninety days or longer.
If the disability for a twenty-two year old person has continued for
one year, there is a fifty-two percent chance that it will continue for an
additional two years and a thirty-two percent chance that it will con-
tinue for an additional five years. If the person is fifty-seven and the
disability has continued for a year, there is a seventy-three percent
chance that it will continue for two additional years and a fifty-five per-
cent chance that it will continue for an additional five years.
Moses & Pope, supra note 2, at 512-13 (citation omitted).
159. See, e.g., McMahan et al., supra note 38.
160. Lombard et al., supra note 4, at 1 (discussing some difficulties of guardianships).
161. Id.
162. See, e.g., McMahan et al., supra note 38, at 99.
163. See Moses & Pope, supra note 2, at 512-13 (discussing problems of disability).
Mr. Moses and Ms. Pope note that even physical disability unaccompanied by
mental disability can create "physical and emotional obstacles to the exercise of
sound judgment." Id. at 512.
164. See McMahan et al., supra note 38, at 99 ("One of the principal uses of powers of
attorney is to delegate to an agent the management and control of the principal's
property during mental incapacity or other disability.").
165. E.g., id., at 99-105; Schmitt & Hatfield, supra note 29, at 211-14.
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lect the person to be named as agent.166 Some have written about the
factors that a principal should consider when choosing an agent.167
For example, commentators have discussed the need for certain skills
to make certain decisions, and have suggested that splitting the broad
durable power of attorney into several components might best carry
out the wishes of the principal.168 One author has suggested that it is
wise to have the named agent or agents sign the durable power of at-
torney to indicate acceptance of the duties thereunder.169 What is
strangely lacking, however, is any discussion of what standards
should govern the behavior of the agent or any suggestion that the
principal should discuss the agent's appointment with the agent to en-
sure that the agent understands his role.
In light of the popularity of the durable power of attorney as a
planning tool, it is critically important that the role of the agent be
better defined. This is particularly true because estate planning attor-
neys often market the durable power of attorney to clients as an alter-
native to a trust or guardianship.17 0 Without a clearly defined role,
the agent may not perform the way the principal expects, and the
principal may suffer financially by choosing to execute the durable
power of attorney rather than to create a trust. Although it is difficult
to say that a client "chooses" a durable power of attorney rather than a
guardianship, the client's decision to execute a durable power of attor-
ney may discourage others from instituting a protective proceeding. If
the principal has nominated the agent under his durable power of at-
torney to serve as his guardian, interested third parties may refrain
from petitioning for guardianship because they do not appreciate the
increased protection of the principal that a guardianship would afford.
The client's execution of a durable power of attorney may even lead to
a court refusing to appoint a guardian upon finding that the principal
is incompetent. 373 Because use of the financial durable power of attor-
ney makes it less likely that other methods of coping with disability
will be used, we must ensure that the financial durable power of attor-
ney adequately copes with the principal's incompetence.
166. E.g., McMahan et al., supra note 38, at 101 ("Careful consideration also should be
given to the selection of an agent having knowledge of the business and of the
owner's desires in connections [sic] with continuation of the business."); BoPDnN
ET AL., supra note 45, at 209 §§ 2.13-2.22.
167. See, e.g., Lombard, supra note 3, at 202.
168. See id. Mr. Lombard suggests that it may be advisable to have one agent make
financial decisions and another make health decisions. Id.
169. Sturgul, supra note 32, at 28. See also MODEL SPECL& POWER OF ArroRNxv FOR
SMALL PROPERTY INTEREsTS ACT § 1(b)(2) (1964)(requiring consent of agent to
serve for validity of durable power of attorney).
170. See, e.g., In re Estate of Hegel, 668 N.E.2d 474, 478 (Ohio 1996)(Stratton, J., dis-
senting)(noting attorneys encourage use of durable power of attorney to avoid
court supervision).
171. See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
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A. Common Ground
All states recognize that an agent under a durable power of attor-
ney is a fiduciary.172 A number of states have enacted this principle
in their laws governing durable powers of attorney. 73 Even if no stat-
ute addresses the issue, courts usually reach the same conclusion us-
ing common-law agency principles. 174
A fiduciary is one who is entrusted with the property of another.175
A number of legal implications flow from the fiduciary relationship,
and there are some areas of common ground that are well-settled.
First and foremost, a fiduciary owes a duty of loyalty to the person
who equitably owns the property.' 76 Also, any fiduciary dealing with
the property of another has a duty to act prudently with respect to
that property.' 77 If the fiduciary fails to act prudently, an interested
party could institute an action to surcharge the fiduciary.' 78
172. See Lombard, supra note 3, at 197.
173. E.g., ARax CODE ANN. § 28-69-201 (Michie 1987)(defining "fiduciary" to include
agent); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 46:2B-19 (West Supp. 1996)(providing agent is fiduci-
ary); S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-5-501 (Law. Co-op. 1995)("The attorney in fact has a
fiduciary relationship with the principal and is accountable and responsible as a
fiduciary."). See also Moses & Pope, supra note 2, at 522 (suggesting that prede-
cessor of section 62-5-501(A) is broad enough to require consideration of caselaw
about fiduciaries in addition to statutes).
174. See, e.g., Sevigny v. New South Federal Savings and Loan Ass'n, 586 So. 2d 884,
887 (Ala. 1991)(noting principal-agent relationship is fiduciary); McHaney v.
McHaney, 190 S.W.2d 450, 454 (Ark. 1945)(noting all agencies create fiduciary
relations); King v. Bankerd, 492 A.2d 608, 613 (Md. 1985)(noting fiduciary rela-
tionship of principal and agent).
175. See generally Scorr & FRATcHER, supra note 128, § 2.5. There are a variety of
fiduciary relationships: 1)trustee-beneficiary; 2) agent-principal; 3) guardian-
ward; and 4) attorney-client. Id.
176. See, e.g., Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545 (N.Y. 1928). In one of the most fre-
quently quoted descriptions of the duty of loyalty, Chief Justice Cardozo said in
Meinhard, "[a] trustee is held to something stricter than the morals of the market
place. Not honesty alone, but the punctilio of an honor most sensitive, is then the
standard of behavior." Id. at 546. See also Cal. Prob. Code § 4232 (West Supp.
1995)(providing agent under durable power of attorney has duty to act solely in
the principal's interest and avoid conflicts of interest). Id. § 4234 (requiring
agent keep in contact with principal to extent practicable).
177. See, e.g., In re Estate of Denlinger, 297 A.2d 478, 480 (Pa. 1972)(fiduciary is "re-
quired to use such common skill, prudence and caution as a prudent man, under
similar circumstances would exercise in the management of his own estate; and if
he negligently causes a loss to an estate he may properly be surcharged for the
amount of such loss").
178. See Lombard, supra note 3, at 201. Mr. Lombard notes that the principal could
sue the agent for the agent's imprudence, and that third parties might be able to
sue as well. Id. For example, the heirs of a deceased principal might be able to
sue an agent who imprudently wasted the principal's assets. See id. See also
Vaughn v. Batchelder, 633 So. 2d 526 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994)(removing per-
sonal representative of deceased principal's estate because personal representa-
tive breached fiduciary duty while serving as agent under durable power of
attorney and estate had claim against agent for misconduct).
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One approach that attorneys may use to try to prevent surcharge
actions is the inclusion of an exculpatory clause in durable powers of
attorney.17 9 For example, a drafter could provide that the agent will
be liable only in the case of gross misconduct.' 8 0 Although there are
no reported cases addressing the use of exculpatory clauses in durable
powers of attorney, it is likely that courts would apply principles simi-
lar to those applied to exculpatory clauses in trusts.'18 In virtually
every state, a settlor can relieve the trustee of liability for ordinary
negligence if he so chooses.182 Although courts strictly construe excul-
patory clauses,' 8 3 they uphold exculpatory clauses unless there is a
violation of public policy.184
Further, a court of appropriate jurisdiction has the power to super-
vise the acts of a fiduciary.185 Court supervision may be more intense
when the person to whom the fiduciary duty is owed is
incompetent.- 8 6
The fiduciary duty governs all matters within the scope of the
agency.' 8 7 It is clear that the agent must act prudently when he
acts.188 The duty arises even if the agent is not compensated.18 9 Un-
like a guardianship or trust setting, the agent does not appear to have
179. See Sturgul, supra note 32, at 40 (offering form that makes agent liable only in
the case of the "agent's own misconduct or negligence"); Schmitt & Hatfield,
supra note 29, at 226 (including provision releasing agent from liability in list of
"basic" provisions for durable power of attorney).
180. See Lombard, supra note 3, at 202 (suggesting helpfulness of provision limiting
agent's liability to cases of "gross misconduct or fraud").
181. See generally ScoTr & FRATCHER, supra note 128, § 222.
182. E.g., Sullivan v. Mosner, 295 A.2d 482 (Md. 1972); Corpus Christi Natl Bank v.
Gerdes, 551 S.W.2d 521 (Tex. Civ. App. 1977). See RESTATEm:ENT (SECOND) OF
TRusTs § 222 (1957). See also SCOTT & FRTCHER, supra note 128, § 222 (collect-
ing cases).
183. See, e.g., Milbank v. J.C. Littlefield, Inc., 36 N.E.2d 833 (Mass. 1941); Tuttle v.
Gilmore, 36 N.J. Eq. 617 (Ct. Errors & App. 1883). See also Scorr & FRATCHER,
supra note 128, § 222.2.
184. E.g., Browning v. Fidelity Trust Co., 250 F. 321 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 248 U.S.
564 (1918); In re Andrus, 281 N.Y.S. 831 (Surr. Ct. 1935). See also Scourr &
FRATCHER, supra note 128, § 222.3.
185. See Friedman & Savage, supra note 90, at 273-74.
186. E.g., CoLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 15-14-609 (West Supp. 1995). Under the Colorado
statute, after a court determination that a principal "lacks the capacity to control
or revoke the agency instrument," the court can examine the acts of an agent
under a durable power of attorney. Id. If the court finds that the agent's actions
or lack thereof are not adequately protecting the principal's interests, the court
can order a range of remedial actions, including appointment of a guardian or
conservator with full or limited powers. Id. See Friedman & Savage, supra note
90, at 274.
187. RESTATEmENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 13 (1957); Gagnon v. Coombs, 654 N.E.2d
54, 60 (Mass. App. Ct. 1995).
188. See, e.g., McHaney v. McHaney, 190 S.W.2d 450, 454 (Ark. 1945)(Noting agent
may not perform any act "which defeats or hinders the efforts of his principal to
accomplish the purpose for which the agency was established").
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a duty to act at all unless he has agreed to act or has acted to cause
detrimental reliance by the principal.l 90 Some commentators, how-
ever, view the durable power of attorney as creating a "less formal"
fiduciary relationship than a trust or guardianship.191
B. Unexplored Territory
What has not been addressed in most states, however, is whether
fiduciary principles should guide the agent in determining whether to
act at all or whether to continue to act once a person has begun serv-
ing as agent.192 A few state legislatures have gone beyond a simple
pronouncement that an agent is a fiduciary and have spoken more
precisely on the duties of agents. Several states have made it quite
clear that an agent need not exercise the powers given him in a dura-
ble power of attorney.193 Such a position is dangerous in light of the
way that durable powers of attorney are being marketed to clients by
estate planning attorneys.
189. E.g., McHaney v. McHaney, 190 S.W.2d 450, 454 (Ark. 1945). Cf CAL. PROB.
CODE § 4231 (West Cum. Supp. 1996)(providing agent must act as prudent per-
son when he acts, but uncompensated agent is liable only for losses resulting
from "bad faith, intentional wrongdoing or gross negligence"); GA. CODE ANN.
§ 10-6-22 (Michie 1994)(stating uncompensated agent liable only for gross ne-
glect). In light of the lack of definition of the standards governing the agent's
behavior, it is perhaps not surprising that the law governing compensation of the
agent is similarly murky. See Lombard, supra note 3, at 204. Most of the states
use a reasonableness standard: if the governing instrument is silent, the agent is
entitled to reasonable compensation. E.g., CAL. PROB. CODE § 4204 (West Supp.
1996); Mo. REv. STAT. § 404.725 (Vernon 1990). See also Sturgul, supra note 32,
at 27 (noting most states have applied reasonableness standard when issue of
agent's compensation has arisen).
190. See RESTATEmNT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §§ 377, 378 (1958).
191. Lombard, supra note 3, at 197. Discussing the question of required accountings,
Lombard notes that the durable power of attorney "is intended as an alternative
to a more formal fiduciary relationship, such as a guardianship or trusteeship
with its expense and loss of flexibility." Id. Thus, Lombard concludes that the
failure of most states to require accountings by agents under durable powers of
attorney is appropriate. Id.
192. See McHaney v. McHaney, 190 S.W.2d 450, 454 (Ark. 1945)(noting duty of good
faith and loyalty once agent has assumed duties); Cal. Prob. Code § 4128 (West
Supp. 1996)(requiring form durable power of attorney sold or distributed for use
by person without legal counsel contain phrase "Your agent (attorney-in-fact) has
no duty to act unless you and your agent agree otherwise in writing"); CAL. PROB.
CODE § 4230 (West Supp. 1995)(providing agent has no duty to act unless agent
has already begun transaction or principal and agent have agreed otherwise).
193. E.g., CAL. PROB. CODE § 4230 (West Supp. 1996)(providing agent has duty to act
only if necessary to complete transaction agent has already begun or if agent and
principal agreed that agent would act); CoLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 15-14-606 (West
Supp. 1995)(providing "agent is under no duty to exercise the powers granted by
the agency or to assume control of or responsibility for any of the principal's prop-
erty, care, or affairs, regardless of the principal's physical or mental condition").
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The type of action or inaction by an agent under a durable power of
attorney that will lead to liability has not been clearly defined. There
is not much caselaw on the issue, and, as one court noted, appellate
courts have not often had the opportunity to analyze powers of attor-
ney.19 4 Although most reported cases deal with whether an agent
breached his fiduciary duty by making gifts of the principal's prop-
erty,19 5 various grounds have been asserted as possible bases for lia-
bility.196 Legislative attempts to prevent abuses are extremely
rare.
197
There are a number of types of conduct that could give rise to a
surcharge action. These include the failure of the agent to act at all on
behalf of a principal; the agent taking action with respect to some
property, but not as to other property; and the agent taking action
with respect to all property. These will be discussed seriatim.
First, what of the person named in a durable power of attorney
who simply refuses to act? Clearly, a person cannot be forced to act as
agent. Courts have acknowledged that various fiduciary offices are
absolutely necessary to society.' 9 8 Courts also recognize that the fidu-
ciary's role is a difficult one.' 99
An assumption of powers as agent under a durable power of attor-
ney could cause federal tax consequences. 2 00 For example, if the prin-
cipal owned a life insurance policy on the agent's life, the government
might argue that the policy proceeds are includable in the agent's
gross estate for federal estate tax purposes.20 1 Also, a power to make
194. King v. Bankerd, 492 A.2d 608, 611 (Md. Ct. App. 1985).
195. See, e.g., Hodges v. Surratt, 366 So. 2d 768 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978); Kline v.
Orebaugh, 519 P.2d 691 (Kan. 1974).
196. In Eby Estate, for example, the Pennsylvania Orphans' Court considered an alle-
gation by the executor of the will of a deceased principal that an agent under a
durable power of attorney should be surcharged for failing to sell the principal's
home and automobile after the principal moved into a nursing home. 6 D.&C.3d
371, 197-98 (Pa. Ct. Com. Pls. O.C. Div. 1977). See also Gagnon v. Coombs. 654
N.E.2d 54, 56 (App. Ct. Mass. 1995)(describing situations in which agent trans-
ferred principal's property to herself as trustee of irrevocable trust even though
principal had contracted to sell property).
197. See, e.g., AiAsKA CODE § 13.26.358 (Supp. 1995)(forbidding "public home care pro-
vider," who is a home care provider paid with state finds, from acting as agent
under power of attorney given by one to whom he is providing care).
198. See, e.g., In re Estate of Denlinger, 297 A.2d 478, 481 (Pa. 1972)(mentioning of-
fices of administrator, executor, and guardian).
199. See id. (noting fiduciary's office "is attended in its faithful discharge with trouble,
anxiety, and hazard")(quoting Keller's Appeal, 8 Pa. 288, 289-90 (1848)).
200. See Moses & Pope, supra note 2, at 531-34 (discussing potential tax problems for
agents).
201. See, e.g., Estate of Bloch, 78 T.C. 850 (1982); Terriberry v. United States, 517
F.2d 286 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 977 (1976); Rose v. United States,
511 F.2d 259 (5th Cir. 1975); Estate of Skifter, 468 F.2d 699 (2d Cir. 1972).
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gifts to one's self could cause inclusion.202 The agent need not serve if
he or she is concerned about such consequences.
In some cases, the person named as agent may not even be aware
of the appointment. 20 3 In those cases, it would be unjust to impose
any liability on the person named if he does not act.20 4 This would
include liability for any damages that occur because the principal's
assets were not properly managed after the principal lost competence.
If a person knows she has been named as the agent under a dura-
ble power of attorney, however, she should not be permitted to do
nothing for an unreasonable period of time and escape liability. Once
the principal loses competence, the agent should have some responsi-
bility to either step in and act on behalf of the principal or take some
action to protect the principal's property.
Consider, for example, an eighty-year-old father and fifty-year-old
daughter. After discussion with the daughter, the father has his at-
torney draw up a broad financial durable power of attorney naming
the daughter as agent. The father's health begins to fail, and his man-
agement of his assets becomes increasingly lax. The value of his as-
sets declines significantly as a result of this mismanagement. 20 5
Should the daughter be held liable for failing to intervene?
The answer should depend on whether the principal is competent.
If the principal is competent, the daughter should not be held liable
for failing to intervene in her father's financial affairs. This is so be-
cause the principal's wishes are always paramount while he is compe-
tent. The rights of a competent principal must, of course, be
respected.20 6 Just as some states have attempted to make guardian-
ship minimally intrusive,20 7 the principles governing durable powers
of attorney should not encourage agents to intrude in the affairs of
202. Sturgul, supra note 32, at 32-33; Ann Weber, Power to Make Gifts: Tax Protection
for the Attorney in Fact or Trustee, 1 The Elder Law Report 11 (May 1990).
203. See Lombard, supra note 3, at 202.
204. See id. Lombard suggests that a court could neither compel an agent who has not
agreed to his appointment as agent to serve, nor could it hold him liable for refus-
ing to serve. Id.
205. It is not difficult to imagine the myriad of ways in which such a decline could
occur. Missed mortgage payments could lead to a default, unpaid insurance pre-
miums could lead to policy cancellation, unwatched investments could dissipate,
and unpaid obligations could incur penalties, to name but a few possibilities.
206. See, e.g., Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 2111.02(C)(5),(6) (Anderson 1994)(providing
court must consider proffered evidence of less restrictive alternative to guardian-
ship and court may base denial of guardianship on fact that less restrictive alter-
native exists). See Friedman & Savage, supra note 90, at 289-90 (discussing
negative implications of overuse of conservatorships; suggesting conservatee
should be given more autonomy).
207. California law relating to conservatorship of the "developmentally disabled" aims
to make conservatorship minimally intrusive. See Friedman & Savage, supra
note 90, at 287 (citing CAL. PROB. CODE § 1828.5(e) (West Supp. 1987)).
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competent principals. If, on the other hand, the principal is incompe-
tent, the daughter should be potentially liable for failing to intervene.
At first blush, this rule attaching potential liability of the agent to
incapacity of the principal might seem to place an unreasonable bur-
den on the agent. Although there is a burden, it is not unreasonable.
It is true that the agent may have difficulty determining when the
principal becomes incompetent. This difficulty could be overcome. For
example, a durable power of attorney could include a provision that
specifies a procedure for determining when the principal is incompe-
tent.2 08 Such provisions are already widely used in springing pow-
ers.2 09 Further, the courts could develop a test that would not be too
harsh on agents. The agent could be required to make reasonable pe-
riodic investigation into the competency of the principal and be liable
only if she unreasonably concludes that the principal is competent
when the principal is incompetent.
The burden on the agent is necessary to ensure that the principal
will be adequately protected upon incompetence. This is the purpose
of durability. Furthermore, estate planning attorneys often tout dura-
ble powers of attorney as an alternative to guardianships, and it is
unlikely that clients interpret this as meaning that a durable power of
attorney is effective only if the agent decides to act.2 10 If we fail to
impose liability on named agents who know of the principal's incompe-
tence and take no action, then we have truly created a monster in the
durable power of attorney.
It has been suggested that a court could not impose liability on a
named agent who has not agreed to serve as agent.2 11 A few states
have adopted this position.212 It does not seem unreasonable, how-
208. See, e.g., ALAsKA STAT § 13.26.353 (Supp. 1995)(setting forth procedure to estab-
lish disability of principal).
209. See U.P.C. § 5-501 comment, 8 U.L.A. 513 (1987)(suggesting springing power
could require two named persons concur that principal is incapable of managing
financial affairs and inform the agent in writing); Lombard, supra note 3, at 204
(suggesting procedures). See also Sturgul, supra note 32, at 26 (suggesting that
the wide variety of methods for determining when the power should spring into
effectiveness implies that "no one method has proven greatly superior to any
other").
210. E.g., In re Estate of Hegel, 668 N.E.2d 474, 478 (Ohio 1996)(Stratton, J., dissent-
ing)(opining that most clients "have little appreciation of the difference in the
roles of guardian and attorney-in-fact other than one seems less complicated to
use than the other").
211. Lombard, supra note 3, at 202. Lombard notes, however, that a different result
could obtain if the agent agreed to serve in advance or began to serve, then
wanted to stop serving. Id.
212. CAL. PROB. CoDE § 4230 (West Supp. 1996). Section 4230 is a broad provision
protecting agents named in powers of attorney. First, it provides that a named
agent has no duty to exercise the powers granted to the agent in the power of
attorney, regardless of the principal's condition. Id. § 4230(a). Second, although
the section requires the agent to complete any transaction already commenced, it
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ever, to require the agent to notify someone that the agent chooses not
to serve. The court with jurisdiction over guardianship proceedings
would seem a likely choice for such notification. If such a rule were
adopted, prudent principals would discuss the durable power of attor-
ney with the named agent and obtain a commitment that the agent
would act.2 13 Even if an agent agrees to act as agent, there may be
disagreement concerning the extent of the agent's duties.2 14
Adequate asset management may require a broad range of activi-
ties. Most estates need the following types of action: 1) management
of investments; 2) collection of debts; and 3) filing of tax returns and
payment of taxes. 21 5 Additionally, in larger or more complicated es-
tates, the manager might also wish to: 4) disclaim property interests;
5) make estate planning gifts; 6) claim the elective share of the estate
of a deceased spouse; 7) pursue litigation on behalf of the principal;
and 8) adjust the principal's assets to qualify for various tax benefits
at the principal's death.216
makes clear that no act for the principal obligates the agent to perform another
act. Id. § 4230(b). Third, the section allows the principal and agent to agree in
writing that the agent will have certain duties. Only in the case of such an agree-
ment, must the agent act under the power of attorney. Id. § 4230(c).
In connection with the enactment of section 4230, the Law Review Commis-
sion commented that, "[the principal wants someone to have the ability to act if
something needs to be done, but rarely would the principal expect to impose a
duty to act on a friend or family member who chooses not to do so." CAL. PROB.
CODE § 4230, Law Revision Commission Comment (West Supp. 1996). The com-
ment also makes clear that the agent can choose not to act at any time and for
any reason, including mere inconvenience. Id. See also BoRDin ET AL., supra note
45, at 209, § 1.2, at 6 (noting rules in section 4230 "are intended to facilitate use
of powers of attorney by allowing a person who might be reluctant to be named as
agent to accept the designation and then determine on a situation-by-situation
basis whether to act").
213. See Schmitt & Hatfield, supra note 29, at 224 n.75 (suggesting durable power of
attorney for health care be discussed with agent "to ensure he or she is comforta-
ble carrying out the tasks set forth"; failing to suggest similar discussion with
respect to durable power of attorney for financial management).
214. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 10-6-142 (Michie Supp. 1996). In the Georgia statutory
form for financial durable power of attorney, there is an "Acceptance of Appoint-
ment" form for the agent to sign. The Acceptance states in part, "I must protect
and conserve, and exercise prudence and caution in my dealings with, the Princi-
pal's funds and other assets." Id. This provision arguably imposes the duty on
the agent who accepts appointment to act with respect to all of the principal's
assets.
215. See Moses & Pope, supra note 2, at 514 n.5. Moses and Pope suggest that "under
appropriate circumstances" the Code's requirements for trustees could be im-
posed on agents because the South Carolina statute they are discussing says that
the agent has a fiduciary relationship with the principal. Id.
216. For example, if real property is used for a qualified use, such as farming, on the
date of the owner's death, the property can be valued for Federal Estate Tax pur-
poses at its value for its use rather than its fair market value. I.R.C. § 2032A
(1996). Similarly, the Internal Revenue Code reduces the burden that the Fed-
eral Estate Tax would have on an estate that consists largely of a closely held
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After a principal loses competence and the agent has agreed to
serve, the agent should be held liable if he fails to prudently manage
all of the principal's assets. The agent should be held to a standard of
reasonable diligence in locating all of the principal's assets.
The current law in most states is that an agent can pick and choose
when to act, even after the principal loses competence. Although this
poses little problem when there is a competent principal to monitor
the agent's acts, it is an especially dangerous rule when applied to
durable powers. If an outside observer sees the agent adequately
managing one piece of the principal's property, he may assume that all
of the principal's property is being appropriately managed. Thus, he
may not investigate any further, even if he believes that the principal
is incompetent.
The law should be changed with respect to agents of incompetent
principals. An agent acting for an incompetent principal should not be
permitted to pick and choose which of the principal's assets he will
manage and leave any other assets unmanaged. Rather, once the
agent should reasonably know that the principal is incompetent and
that he has been named as agent, the agent should be required to
either: 1) refuse to serve as agent and make his refusal known; 2) ac-
cept responsibility for those assets he wishes to manage and institute
a protective proceeding to assure adequate management of the princi-
pal's other assets; or 3) agree to serve as agent and try to take control
of the principal's entire estate.
With respect to a requirement of notice by the agent who does not
wish to serve, several possibilities exist. First, an agent could always
inform a competent principal that the agent would not serve in the
future. Second, if the principal is incompetent, some procedure could
be crafted to ensure protection of the principal. Perhaps the governing
instrument could require the agent to notify the principal's "closest
relative" or "treating physician." Perhaps the named agent should no-
tify the court that would have jurisdiction over protective proceedings
or some local social welfare organization. Many possibilities exist re-
garding effective communication of the agent's desire not to serve in a
way that would perhaps prompt institution of a protective proceeding.
Each state should create the notice mechanism that best suits its
needs and is in line with available resources. In California, for exam-
ple, a Court Investigator's Office already exists, and unwilling agents
could notify it.
Such changes in the law would probably cause attorneys to change
the ways they handle durable powers of attorney. First, it would be
foolish not to discuss the agent's role with the named agent to make
business by allowing the tax to be paid in installments if certain conditions are
met. I.R.C. § 6166 (1996).
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certain that the agent is at least currently willing and able to serve. If
possible, most would want the agent to agree to serve in writing. Sec-
ond, attorneys would probably advise against appointing agents who
were reluctant to manage all of the principal's financial affairs. The
only situation in which partial management seems to make sense is
when several agents manage separate portions of the principal's es-
tate, and the portions add up to the entire estate. All of these changes
would be steps toward better protection of incompetent principals.
The law governing resignation of agents under durable powers of
attorney should also be crafted to ensure adequate protection of an
incompetent principal. It has been suggested that because the agent
has a fiduciary relationship to the principal, the agent may not be able
to resign after the principal becomes incompetent if the resignation
would be detrimental to the principal.2 17 One can reach that conclu-
sion by analogizing to the law that limits the resignation of trust-
ees 218 and executors.219 Most states follow the rule that a trustee can
resign if. 1) all of the beneficiaries are sui juris and consent; 2) the
court with jurisdiction over the trust administration approves; or 3)
the instrument allows the trustee to resign without court or benefici-
ary approval.220 The purpose of limiting the right of the trustee to
resign is to ensure the uninterrupted administration of the trust. Fre-
quently, state statutes provide procedures to be followed when trust-
ees resign.221 Often, a guardian's power to resign is similarly
limited,222 as is an executor's power.2 23 California has adopted a sim-
ilar rule for agents.224
The analogy is a good one. There are limitations on the power of a
trustee or executor to resign because such limitations are necessary to
protect the assets over which the fiduciary has responsibility. When a
principal becomes incompetent, the same is true.
217. Moses & Pope, supra note 2, at 524.
218. Id.
219. Id.
220. See, e.g., Ledbetter v. First State Bank & Trust Co., 85 F.3d 1537 (11th Cir.
1996); RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF TRUSTS § 106 (1957); IND. CODE ANN. § 30-4-3-
29(a) (West Supp. 1996). Cf In re Sherman B. Smith Family Trust, 482 N.W.2d
118 (Wis. Ct. App. 1992)(affirming lower court's refusal to let trustee resign de-
spite trust provision allowing resignation without court approval).
221. See, e.g., 20 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3184 (1996).
222. See, e.g., S.D. CODIFIED LAwS ANN. § 29A-5-503 (1996)(requiring court approval
for resignation).
223. See, e.g., 20 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3184 (1996).
224. CAL. PROB. CODE § 4207 (West Supp. 1996). Section 4207 allows an agent to re-
sign in four ways: 1) by notifying a competent principal; 2) by notifying an ap-





Most of the litigation involving durable powers of attorney seems
to arise from allegedly improper gifts made by agents. In addition,
some litigation results when a disappointed legatee learns that an act
performed by an agent under a durable power of attorney adeemed the
legatee's gift. Better definition of the agent's role could help resolve
both of these issues.
1. Gift Giving/Self-dealing
Because an agent must act in the principal's best interest, an inter-
esting question arises when the agent wants to make a gift of the prin-
cipal's property. Under traditional agency law, gift giving was beyond
the scope of an agent's authority.225 For various reasons, however, a
gift of the principal's property may benefit the principal in ways other
than mere maintenance of asset value.2 2 6 For example, gifts are fre-
quently part of an effective estate plan.22 7 Under the current Federal
Gift Tax, a person can give $10,000 annually to as many people as he
or she pleases without incurring any tax.228 Similarly, transfers to
pay the medical or educational expenses of another are not subject to
the gift tax.2 2 9 Many estate planners advise a program of significant
lifetime gifts to minimize the size of the principal's estate, which could
be taxable at death under the Federal Estate Tax.230 In addition, the
principal may obtain greater entitlement to benefits like Medicaid by
reducing the amount of his wealth using a gift-giving program.
If a durable power of attorney is silent as to whether the agent has
the power to make gifts of the principal's property, the agent is placed
in an uncertain position in most states.231 It can be argued that gift-
225. E.g., King v. Bankerd, 492 A.2d 608, 612 (Md. 1985)(opining that gift of princi-
pal's property by agent does not benefit principal when gift not specifically au-
thorized and no evidence principal intended gift). See Sturgul, supra note 32, at
31.
226. But see Johnson v. Fraccacreta, 348 So. 2d 570, 572 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977)(not-
ing and rejecting agent's argument that estate planning value was consideration
for transfer so principal received benefit). See also Sturgul, supra note 32, at 31-
32 (gift giving can further Medicaid and estate planning).
227. See generally Finn-Deluca, supra note 69, at 893-94 (discussing federal transfer
tax benefits of making lifetime gifts).
228. I.R.C. § 2503(b)(1996).
229. I.R.C. § 2503(e) (1996).
230. I.R.C. § 2001 (1996)(imposing estate tax); I.R.C. § 2031 (1994)(defining gross es-
tate upon which estate tax is imposed). See generally Finn-Deluca, supra note 69,
(discussing difficulties caused by IRS position that gifts made under durable pow-
ers of attorney that do not expressly empower agent to make gifts are revocable).
231. See, e.g., Douglas S. Colosky, Case Comment, The Estate ofAntone: Does an Attor-
ney in Fact Have Power to Make Gift Under Short Form Power of Attorney Stat-
ute?, 10 CONN. PROB. L.J. 369 (1996)(discussing Connecticut law); Finn-Deluca,
supra note 69, at 899 (noting most states' courts and legislatures have not ad-
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giving violates the agent's fiduciary duty to the principal.2 3 2 Many
states have held that an agent cannot make a gift of the principal's
property to himself unless the governing instrument expressly gives
the power to make gifts. 233
Other states are more liberal about the gift-giving power of an
agent. For example, Pennsylvania revised its durable power of attor-
ney legislation in 1982.234 One of the statutory changes was the inclu-
sion of a broad power to make gifts. 2 35 The section describing this
gift-making power also sets forth a principle of responsibility with re-
spect to gifts made under a durable power of attorney:
An attorney-in-fact and the donee of a gift shall be responsible as equity and
justice may require to the extent that a gift made by the attorney-in-fact is
inconsistent with the prudent estate planning or financial management or
with the known or probable intent of the principal with respect to the disposi-
tion of his estate.2 3 6
The focus on equity and prudent management makes more sense than
a rule that limits gift-giving authority.
In light of the desire that durable powers of attorney be as flexible
as possible, strict interpretation of documents to deny the agent the
power to make gifts is not the answer to perceived abuses or the fear
of abuses by agents. Rather, the standards governing the agent's be-
havior should be more clearly articulated so that misbehavior can be
avoided by agents. If agents do misbehave, then a surcharge action
would be appropriate.
Consider, for example, a mother with three children who grants a
financial durable power of attorney to her oldest child. The instru-
ment is silent as to the agent's power to make gifts on behalf of the
mother. Soon thereafter, the mother has a stroke, is expected to live
for no more than three months, and is completely unable to communi-
cate. Her child, the agent, decides to make cash gifts of $10,000 each
to each of the principal's three children (including himself), the three
children's spouses and the principal's six grandchildren. Three of the
dressed this issue)(citing Schmitt & Hatfield, supra note 29, at 210). Cf Mfischke
v. Mischke, 247 Neb. 752, 759, 530 N.W.2d 235, 241 (1995)(holding agent cannot
make gifts of principal's property unless instrument expressly grants such power
and principal's intent to make such a gift is shown).
232. See Schmitt & Hatfield, supra note 29, at 212 n.29. Schmitt and Hatfield note
that "giving away the principal's estate basically is inconsistent with the agent's
fiduciary duty." Id.
233. E.g., CAL. PROB. CODE § 4264(c) (West 1995)(prohibiting agent from making gift
of principal's property unless expressly authorized by power of attorney); Fender
v. Fender, 329 S.E.2d 430, 431 (S.C. 1985).
234. 20 PA. CoNs. STAT. ANN. ch. 56 (1996). The current statute blends provisions of
the 1979 Act with a New York adoption by reference model. See Lombard, supra
note 3, at 196.
235. 20 PA. CoNs. STAT. ANN. § 5603 (Supp. 1996).
236. 20 PA. CoNs. STAT. ANN. § 5603(a)(4) (Supp. 1996).
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grandchildren are children of the agent. The mother had made no
prior gifts and has assets worth well over $2,000,000. Her will divides
her estate among her issue, per stirpes.
Was there abuse of the power of attorney by the agent? Per-
haps.237 But the solution to the abuse is not to interpret the docu-
ment so that the gifts were invalid. Doing so would force $120,000
back into the mother's estate to be taxed. Rather, the answer is to
judge the agent's behavior under a well-defined standard: did the
agent act prudently in the principal's best interest?
Even in the guardianship setting, legislatures are beginning to rec-
ognize that it may be appropriate for the guardian to use the incompe-
tent's funds for the benefit of persons other than the incompetent. For
example, the guardian may be able to use assets to benefit the depen-
dents of the incompetent.238 The governing statute may also permit
the guardian to make gifts to the incompetent's relatives and friends
or to charities. 239
2. Ademption and Other Dispositive Provisions
If the agent knows that the principal has made a will or created a
trust that will distribute assets after the principal's death, the agent
should avoid taking any action that will defeat the principal's estate
plan.24o If, for example, the principal has made specific gifts in a will,
the agent should avoid acts that would defeat those gifts by causing an
237. See, e.g., Gagnon v. Coombs, 654 N.E.2d 54, 62 (Mass. App. Ct. 1995)(holding
agent under durable power of attorney breached her fiduciary duty by transfer-
ring principal's property to irrevocable trust of which she and principal's other
children were remaindermen).
238. OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 2111.50(C) (Anderson 1994).
239. OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 2111.50(B)(7), (D) (Anderson 1994). The Ohio guardian-
ship statute offers a well-thought-out plan for gifts by guardians. For example,
the statute calls for a hearing if the court directs a gift of the incompetens prop-
erty of more than one thousand dollars. OIo REv. CODE ANN. § 2111.50(E) (An-
derson 1994). Furthermore, the statute directs the court to consider such factors
as the incompetent's future financial needs, the tax benefits of the gift, any prior
pattern of giving, and the incompetent's estate plan. Id. § 2111.50(D).
240. COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 15-14-608 (West Supp. 1995)(requiring agent to preserve
principal's estate plan if possible; making agent liable to beneficiary of estate
plan only for acts performed in bad faith). See, e.g., Elkins v. Green, No. CA 92-
1451, 1993 WL 226168 (Ark. Ct. App. June 16, 1993) In Elkins, the principal
opened a bank account that was payable on death to Green. The principal's
agent, acting under a durable power of attorney, withdrew funds from the ac-
count to pay the principal's bills, even though other funds were available. Id. at
*1. This action by the agent affected the principal's estate plan by increasing the
amounts available for the takers under her will and decreasing the amount avail-
able for Green. The court allowed Green to take only the balance remaining in
the account, holding that the agent was empowered to withdraw the funds. Id. at
*4. See also Litvinko v. Downing, 545 S.W.2d 616 (Ark. 1977)(agent under power
of attorney transferred assets that would have passed to principal's sons at her
death to himself; agent violated his fiduciary duty).
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ademption.241 Thus, if the principal devises his house to his daughter,
the agent should avoid selling the house if other assets are available
to fund the principal's care.242 Similarly, if a principal gives an agent
power to fund an inter vivos trust, the agent should not transfer so
many assets to the trust that the estate will be insufficient to pay gifts
made under a will.243 There have been some statutory efforts to pre-
vent an agent's act from working an ademption by extinction.244 If
241. See, e.g., In re Estate of Hegel, 668 N.E.2d 474 (Ohio 1996). In Hegel, an agent
under a durable power of attorney sold the principal's house after the principal
became incompetent. Id. at 475. The principal's will devised the house and its
contents to the agent. Id. When the principal died, the agent asked the executor
for the cash proceeds of the sale that remained in the principal's estate. Id. The
probate court held the devise adeemed by extinction. Id.
The Court of Appeals of Ohio reversed the probate court in a 2-1 decision. In
re Estate of Hegel, No. CA94-12-103, 1995 WL 375841 at *4 (Ohio Ct. App. June
26, 1995), rev'd, 668 N.E.2d 474 (Ohio 1996). Noting a policy to prevent abuse by
a fiduciary when a testator is incompetent, the court held that sale by an agent
when the principal is incompetent does not adeem a specific gift of the sold prop-
erty, and that the taker under the will is entitled to any remaining sale proceeds.
Id. A strenuous dissent argued that a statute provided the rule announced by the
majority applied to court-appointed guardians, and that extending the rule to
agents under durable powers of attorney was the exclusive province of the legisla-
tare. Id. at *5 (Walsh, P.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
The Ohio Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals in a 4-3 decision. In
re Estate of Hegel, 668 N.E.2d 474 (Ohio 1996). The majority relied on the fact
that the language of an Ohio statute limiting ademption by extinction in situa-
tions in which a guardian sells specifically devised property does not create a
similar rule for agents under durable powers of attorney. Id. at 476. The dissent
argued that an act performed by an agent under a durable power of attorney on
behalf of an incompetent principal should not cause ademption. Id. at 477 (Res-
nick, J., dissenting).
The course of the Hegel litigation illustrates the uncertainty surrounding this
issue. Whether an act by an agent can work an ademption by extinction remains
unresolved in most states.
242. See In re Estate of Graham, 533 P.2d 1318, 1323-24 (Kan. 1975)(refusing to allow
sale by agent under durable power of attorney of specifically devised real prop-
erty to work an ademption). See also Litvinko v. Downing, 545 S.W.2d 616, 617
(Ark. 1977)(suggesting transfer of assets for potential use for principal's care
might not violate agent's fiduciary duty even though transfer affected dispositive
plan of principal); Ruppert v. Breault, 222 Neb. 432, 438, 384 N.W.2d 284, 288
(1986)(refusing to impose constructive trust on assets that agent under durable
power of attorney converted from joint names to name of principal only).
243. See Moses & Pope, supra note 2, at 527-28 (discussing possibility of drafting pro-
vision to avoid abatement of gifts under will in cases in which agent depletes
probate estate by transferring assets to trust created by principal).
244. Section 2-608 of the pre-1990 U.P.C. provides that the sale of specifically devised
assets by a guardian did not work an ademption by extinction and that the spe-
cific devisee was entitled to a legacy equal to the net sale price. Many states
adopted this rule. See, e.g., OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2107.501(B) (Anderson 1994).
In 1987, section 2-608 of the U.P.C. was amended to limit ademption when prop-
erty is sold by "an agent acting within the authority of a durable power of attor-
ney for an incapacitated principal." U.P.C. § 2-606(b), 8 U.L.A. 171 (Supp. 1996).
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the agent unreasonably defeats a principal's testamentary desires, the
agent should be liable to the disappointed legatees.
D. Court Supervision and Limits on Liability
Some states have established procedures for court supervision of
agents under durable powers of attorney. In some states, this proce-
dure allows a court to order an account by the agent or to require a
bond of the agent.24 5 The procedure may be available only after the
onset of incompetency. 24 6 A number of states require an attorney-in-
Many states did not similarly amend their statutes. E.g., OHIo REV. CODE ANN.
§ 2107.501(B)(Anderson 1994).
Even such statutes are not complete protection for the taker of a specific gift
because the taker is entitled only to proceeds that remain in the estate. Section
5-502 of the U.P.C., however, states:
All acts done by an attorney in fact pursuant to a durable power of attor-
ney during any period of disability or incapacity of the principal have the
same effect and inure to the benefit of and bind the principal and his
successors in interest as if the principal were competent and not dis-
abled. Unless the instrument states a time of termination, the power is
exercisable notwithstanding the lapse of time since the execution of the
instrument.
U.P.C. § 5-502, 8 U.LA. 514 (1987). Some have argued that under similar state
statutes, the act of an agent under a durable power of attorney should change the
principal's estate plan. See, e.g., In re Estate of Hegel, No. CA94-12-103, 1995
WL 375841 at *5 (Ohio Ct. App. June 26, 1995)(Walsh, P.J., dissenting)(arguing
sale of property by agent should have caused ademption; relying in part on Ohio
REv.CODE ANN. § 1337.09(C), which is similar to U.P.C. § 5-502), rev'd, 668
N.E.2d 474 (Ohio 1996); Funk v. Funk, 563 N.E.2d 127, 132 (Ind. Ct. App.
1990)(Staton, J., dissenting)(arguing that sale of property by agent should have
caused application of equitable conversion statute; relying in part on Ind. Code
§ 30-2-11-2 (repealed 1991), which is similar to U.P.C. § 5-502). See also FLA
STAT. ANN. § 709.08(7) (West Supp. 1995)(providing agent cannot perform speci-
fied acts that would change principal's disposition of assets at death unless ex-
pressly so authorized in governing instrument).
245. E.g., CAL. PROB. CODE § 4236(b)(5)(West Supp. 1995)(allowing court to order
agent to account).
246. E.g., S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-5-501(D)(Law. Co-op. Supp. 1995). Section 62-5-501
provides in part:
The court, in its discretion, and at any time after the onset of physical
disability or mental incompetence, on motion of an interested party or on
its own motion, may require that an inventory of all deposits, choses in
action, and personal property must be filed with the court, and a surety
bond must be posted by the attorney in fact in the manner and amount
applicable to a protected person's estate.
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fact to account to a court.247 A court can, of course, require an agent
to account if there is an allegation of impropriety.248
Like the principles governing liability, the level of court supervi-
sion of agents under durable powers of attorney should be higher
when the principal is incompetent. At the very least, a court should
order the agent to account if there is a suggestion by an interested
party that the agent is mismanaging the principal's assets. Because
any property fiduciary has a duty to maintain accurate records, a duty
to account would not be unduly burdensome.
With respect to the limits of the agent's liability, the agent's duty
to act should be lessened in situations in which the agent lacks the
power to act.24 9 In California, for example, a competent spouse can
control his or her incompetent spouse's interest in community prop-
erty.250 Thus, an agent under a durable power should not be held lia-
ble for failing to act with respect to community property when the act
is not permitted by the competent spouse. Similarly, if a power of at-
torney does not authorize an act because of the language of the instru-
ment itself, the agent cannot, in fairness, be held liable for failing to
perform the act.25 1
247. E.g., Mo. ANN. STAT. § 404.727.1 (Vernon 1996)(allowing principal to petition for
accounting by agent while principal is competent and allowing interested party to
petition for accounting if principal is disabled). See Lombard, supra note 3, at
197. Cf Finn-Deluca, supra note 69, at 893 (citing JOHN R. PRICE, PRICE ON CON-
TEmoiAaY ESTATE PLANNING 325 (1992))(stating agent under durable power of
attorney has no duty to account to the court).
248. See Lombard, supra note 3, at 197. See also Sturgul, supra note 32, at 23 (sug-
gesting provision in power requiring periodic accountings by agent ameliorates
potential for problems resulting from lack of judicial supervision).
249. See, e.g., CAL.. PROB. CODE § 15401(c) (West Supp. 1996)(providing agent under
durable power of attorney may not amend or revoke trust unless trust instru-
ment expressly allows); In re Estate of Denlinger, 297 A.2d 478, 481 (Pa.
1972)(noting fiduciary not liable for losses he could not prevent, in this case a
decrease in the value of real property as a result of an amendment to the housing
code).
250. CAL. PROB. CODE § 3051 (West 1996); COLLIN ET AL., supra note 2, § 2.04, at 2-12.
251. Courts often state that powers of attorney are to be strictly construed. E.g.,
Sevigny v. New S. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 586 So. 2d 884,886 (Ala. 1991); Kotsch
v. Kotsch, 608 So. 2d 879, 880 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992); King v. Bankerd, 492
A.2d 608, 611-12 (Md. 1985). See also Sturgul, supra note 32, at 30 (discussing
need for specificity in instruments).
There are several ways that a document might be interpreted to exclude cer-
tain powers. First, if a durable power of attorney specifically grants certain pow-
ers, a judge could hold that a specific power not included is not granted, even in
the face of a provision granting general authority. E.g., King v. Banderd, 492
A-2d 608, 612 (Md. 1985)(discounting general grants of power as "meaningless
verbiage"). See Sturgul, supra note 32, at 30. Second, a court could construe a
provision granting general authority in such a case as giving only the additional
powers needed to carry out the specifically granted powers. E.g., Sevigny v. New
S. Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n., 586 So. 2d 884, 886-87 (Ala. 1991). See Sturgul, supra
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Furthermore, a situation may arise in which the agent cannot act
with respect to a particular asset as a result of circumstances beyond
the agent's control. For example, a durable power of attorney which is
not notarized may not be valid to convey real property located in a
particular state. In such a case, the agent should not be held liable for
failing to act when he cannot act. On the other hand, the agent should
not simply allow the property to waste away, and perhaps has a duty
to institute a guardianship proceeding with respect to the real prop-
erty. One reasonable alternative would be to empower a court to allow
actions that are otherwise impermissible under the durable power of
attorney. This would allow an agent to act as a limited guardian with
court supervision.
In sum, then, there should be a difference between the standard
governing the behavior of an agent of a competent principal and the
standard governing the agent of an incompetent principal.252
Although differing standards lead to difficulties, they are necessary to
both respect and protect the principal.253
The balance between protecting the interests of the principal and
maintaining the flexible efficiency of the durable power of attorney is
difficult to design. Some have expressed concern that too much regu-
lation of agents defeats the goal of the durable power of attorney.254
In addition, commentators fear that too much court supervision of
agents is undesirable. More court supervision is warranted, however,
when the principal is incompetent.255
The law governing use of a durable power of attorney should be
changed to enhance the agent's duty. In the past, protection of assets
of an incompetent was accomplished in one of two ways. The person
could either create a trust while competent, or a court could appoint a
guardian when the person lost competence. Both mechanisms are di-
rective. The trust instrument directs the trustee to act and the guard-
note 32, at 30. See generally Finn-Deluca, supra note 69, at 894 (discussing vari-
ous approaches to interpretation of durable powers of attorney).
252. This point is not often discussed, although at least one commentator has hinted
at it. Lombard, supra note 3, at 197-98. In discussing the rights of third parties
to petition a court for an accounting by an agent, Lombard notes that there is an
"important difference between ordinary conduct by an attorney-in-fact and con-
duct by an attorney-in-fact under a Durable Power after the principal [has] be-
come incompetent." Id. at 198. Lombard concludes that third parties should not
be permitted to interfere with the principal-agent relationship while the principal
is competent. Id.
253. See Lombard, supra note 3, at 198 (discussing difficulty of drafting statute that
appropriately regulates agents of both competent and incompetent principals).
254. Lombard, supra note 3, at 198 (suggesting desirable flexibility of durable power of
attorney could be curtailed by overregulation of the agent's acts).
255. See Friedman & Savage, supra note 90, at 274 (noting that incompetent benefi-
ciaries of fiduciary relationships are "thought to need special protection" and that
fiduciaries are under closer court supervision when their wards are incompetent).
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ianship statute directs the guardian to act. The difficulty of using a
durable power of attorney to accomplish the same purpose is that the
durable power is merely an empowerment mechanism. Under current
law, the principal is left to rely largely on the agent's sense of duty to
protect the principal's assets. Because the durable power of attorney
is intended to function as an alternative to guardianship law, the prin-
ciples that courts apply after the principal loses competence should
more closely resemble guardianship law than traditional agency law.
Aside from enhanced protection of incompetent principals, another
salutary effect of a better-defined standard of behavior for agents
under durable powers of attorney would be a likely increase in the
willingness of third parties to deal with agents. Many have noted that
third parties sometimes refuse to deal with agents under durable pow-
ers.2 5 6 Without a reasonable assurance that third parties will deal
with the agent, the durable power of attorney is not an acceptable al-
ternative to either the trust or a guardianship in the event of
disability.25 7
If a heightened agent duty is adopted, the clear possibility of liabil-
ity might discourage corporate fiduciaries from serving as agents
under durable powers of attorney. This does not raise a significant
issue because most corporate fiduciaries are reluctant even now to
serve as agents.258 In fact, a better-defined standard of behavior for
agents under durable powers of attorney might make corporate fiduci-
aries more willing to serve as agents because it is easier to act in ac-
cordance with a known duty than to act in accordance with a vague
duty.
The same is true for individuals deciding to serve as agents.
Again, the argument that a higher standard will discourage individu-
als from serving as agents is not compelling. Most agents are family
members or close friends who serve because they feel bound to do so.
For such agents, a clearer standard is desirable because they can get
advice about what is required of them and act accordingly. 259
In addition, attorneys should avoid the use of broad exculpatory
clauses. Even a heightened level of agent responsibility imposed by
courts will not help the incompetent principal whose agent is pro-
tected by an exculpatory provision.
256. E.g., Lombard, supra note 3, at 201.
257. Id.
258. Id. at 203. Based on personal experience and conversations with other attorneys,
Lombard suggests that corporate trustees prefer to serve only in the "true fiduci-
ary [roles] of trustee and guardian." Id.
259. See, e.g., Estate of Griffin, 160 Misc. 2d 871, 874 (N.Y. Surr. 1994)(acknowledging
principal's sister, who served as agent under durable power of attorney, appeared




Looking at the state of the law as it exists today, one is left with
the uneasy feeling that durable powers of attorney are being used
with a great deal of faith that things will work out for the best. Cli-
ents are being told that the agent under the durable power of attorney
will be able to take care of all of the principal's financial needs in case
of the principal's disability. While this is true, such advice probably
leaves many clients believing that the agent is under a duty to protect
them in case of disability.
The agent, on the other hand, probably feels that although he is
empowered to act on behalf of the principal, he is under no duty to do
so. The fact that it is generally agreed that the agent is held to some
fiduciary standard when he acts does not answer the larger question:
should a duty to act be imposed on the agent?
Courts should adopt a rule that, once an agent agrees to serve as
an agent, the agent should act for the principal whenever the interests
of the principal require action, and whenever the principal would have
intended action. After the principal loses competence, this standard
would require the agent to assume control of all of the principal's as-
sets. Further, an agent's power to resign after the principal becomes
incompetent should be limited so that there will be continuous man-
agement of the principal's assets.
If the agent is unwilling to accept the responsibility that this
heightened duty entails, then he should refuse to serve as agent. At-
torneys often state that the purpose of creating a durable power in
disability planning is to avoid a guardianship proceeding. However,
this is somewhat misleading. The true purpose is to provide an effec-
tive alternative to a guardianship. If the agent under a durable power
is not held to a standard similar to that of a guardian once the princi-
pal is incompetent, then the use of a durable power of attorney is sim-
ply not an effective alternative. Indeed, if the agent is unwilling to
take responsibility for managing the principal's assets, or to assume
the potential liability that would flow from nonmanagement or mis-
management of those assets, then a guardianship would better serve
the interests of the principal.
It could be argued that this proposed higher standard of conduct
will discourage people from agreeing to serve as agents. If it discour-
ages people who would not be diligent in their roles as agents from
serving as such, then vulnerable members of our society would be bet-
ter protected than they are under the law as it now exists. On the
whole, the burden of any loss of flexibility in the durable power of at-
torney will be far outweighed by the benefit of having it function as
the truly effective alternative to guardianship that its creators in-
tended the durable power of attorney to be.
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